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The main objectives of this study were to acquire an understanding of the role 
labor mobility has on the Eurozone’s economy as a whole. It aims to assess, 
whether  the  movement  of  labor  could  have  a  significant  impact  on  the 
longevity of the EMU and prevention of a slow recovery from an asymmetric 
economic shock on the Eurozone. Additionally, his work examines, what has 
and can be done to lower the barriers to labor mobility in the Eurozone. 
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The free movement of labor  is  a  cornerstone of the Eurozone as it  offers 
significant benefits to the EU as a whole. The economy of the Eurozone has 
recently proven to be asymmetric, and thus vulnerable to economic shocks. 
Yet,  labor  mobility  has  shown  to  function  as  a  stabilizer  of  asymmetric 
economic  shocks.  The  impact  that  labor  mobility  has  on  the  EMU  is 
researched  through  1)  a  literature  review,  2)  conducting  a  case  study 
comparing the trends of labor mobility in two member states of the Eurozone, 
Germany  and  Spain,  with  differentiating  national  economies,  and  3) 
interviewing four EU labor mobility experts from three different member states 
of the EU.


The impact  of  labor  mobility  on  the  Eurozone’s  economy  and  the  EMU’s 
longevity is remarkable, although slight due to its modest extent. Yet, labor 
mobility has been on an upward trend in the EU and thus, the future volume is 
expected to increase. Lowering the administrative and cultural barriers should 
be encouraged through further integration and economic convergence.
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The asymmetric economy of the Eurozone is something that prevents a relatively 
rapid recovery from future financial crises (Arpaia et al., 2016; Frieden and Walter,  
2017). Research further states how the recent Eurosceptic development in multiple 
EU member states has, to an extent, discouraged people to fully utilize the freedom 
of  movement  (Krause et  al.,  2017;  Ritzen and Kahanec,  2017).  Yet,  many other 
barriers for the freedom of labor movement within the EU exist, mostly associated 
with national culture.
There is thus a need for a more open movement of labor in the area in order to 
further develop the economic wellbeing of the member states of the EU. Zaiceva 
(2014) addresses how labor migration has the ability to absorb economic shocks, and 
in addition, Basso et al. (2019) emphasize that it has the ability to work as a method 
of  correcting  asymmetric  economic  shocks.  In  fact,  a  lack  of  extensive  decision-
making power concerning monetary policy, that would equally benefit all the member 
states,  exists  in  the  Eurozone.  The  significance  of  this  research  lies  thus  in 
determining the true impact intra-EU labor mobility has to the EMU and how the time 
of  recovery  from  a  future  economic  shock  which  would  shake  the  state  of  the 
Eurozone could be reduced. The focus is hence on the importance of labor mobility 
as a factor for the longevity and effective operation of the EMU.
This  thesis  is  structured  as  follows:  first,  this  introductory  section  describes 
thoroughly the rationale and purpose of the research. Second, a review of recent 
literature is presented evaluating the overall impact of labor mobility on the EMU and 
Eurozone, suggesting a conceptual framework. Third, the methodology is presented 
explaining the research methods chosen for this study. Then, findings from a case 
study, comparing the labor mobility of  Germany and Spain, two different member 
states of the EU belonging to the Eurozone, before, during, and after the Eurozone 
crisis are presented. Furthermore, four interviews from EU experts on trends of labor 
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mobility in the EU are presented and thoroughly analyzed. The findings made in this 
thesis are further discussed in the fifth section by connecting them to recent trends of 
labor mobility which have been found by academic research. The conclusions to this 
thesis are presented last by considering main findings, implications for International 
Business, and suggestions for further research.
		

The  free  movement  of  labor  is  not  working  to  its  full  extent,  even  though  it  is 
considered as one of the cornerstones of the European Union. The Eurozone crisis 
has  forced  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  to  make  asymmetric  decisions 
concerning monetary policy. This has caused the unbalanced recovery from the crisis 
for the whole Eurozone. This thesis shows the need for labor mobility to be further 
addressed in the future in order to avoid this slow of a recovery from an asymmetric 
economic shock.
The future of the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU (EMU) has been 
substantially discussed recently, as a few member states have had to suffer from 
high unemployment and a lack of financial security since the Eurozone crisis. The 
member states of the EU still facing the consequences can mostly be found from 
Southern Europe whereas the Northern and Central European member states (i.e.  
Germany and Finland) have completely recovered from the crisis and have long seen 
their economies grow. The EU has made the movement of labor possible and the 
issue of  why  the  citizens have not  taken the  full  advantage  of  this  possibility  is  
evaluated. The European Union has already created ‘remedies’ for the weak financial 
situation of some of the southern member states of the Eurozone but the reality is,  
that for  example Greece,  Spain,  and Portugal,  are likely  to still  take long to  fully 
recover. 
The Economic and Monetary Union of  the EU is very difficult  to observe as one 
economy  because  member  states  of  the  E(M)U,  including  the  Eurozone,  have 
enormous differences in their economies and abilities to recover from financial crises. 
This is why it has been extremely difficult for the ECB to adjust their interest rates in a 
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sense that such actions would benefit all members of the Eurozone equally. When 
looking at the longevity of the EU, it is important to take into account how ‘free’ the 
European labor markets are in reality,  due to very different working cultures, and 
other barriers of the ‘free’ movement of labor.
	

This research aims to answer the following four research questions:
 How important is the free movement of labor to the longevity of the Economic
and Monetary Union of the EU?
 Can the free movement of labor provide the Eurozone a means for a more
rapid recovery from asymmetric economic shocks?
 What measures can the European Union take to lower the barriers for EU
citizens to migration?
 Does  labor  mobility  impact  the  effective  operation  of  the  Economic  and
Monetary Union of the EU?
	
The research objectives of this thesis are the following:
 To assess whether an increase in the European Union (EU) labor mobility 
would prevent a slow recovery from asymmetric economic shocks.
 To explore and compare the actions that both the Central and the Southern 
member states of the Eurozone have taken in order to recover from the 
European debt crisis.
 To explore the impact labor mobility has on the effective operation of the 
Economic and Monetary Union of the EU.
 To examine whether an increase in EU labor mobility could unify the European 
economy and therefore build a more stable monetary policy for the member 
states of the Eurozone.
 To find if a freer movement of labor is vital to the longevity of the EMU.
 To explore whether lowering the barriers to integrate into another EU member 
state’s labor market would increase the Euro-optimistic attitudes of persons.
3
 To find concrete ways to lower the barriers to migrate inside the European 
Union.
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In this work, the possibilities of free movement across the European Union of all 
workers and professionals possessing the citizenship of the EU is examined. The 
question on why labor mobility has not been working to its full extent is attempted to 
answer by assessing its impact on the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU. The 
poor  mobility  of  labor  has been considered as one of  the factors behind a slow, 
unbalanced recovery from the Eurozone crisis among the member states. Lacking 
national monetary policy, the Eurozone, the member states of the E(M)U that have 
adopted  the  euro,  cannot  utilize  devaluation  as  an  adjustment  method,  and  the 
movement of labor has been thus thought to be one of the most essential methods of 
adjustment (De Grauwe, 2013; Zaiceva, 2014; Kahanec et al., 2016; Krause et al.,  
2017; Kahanec and Guzi, 2017; Basso et al., 2019). Syed Zwick and Syed (2017) 
state that poor labor mobility during the Eurozone crisis has partially contributed to 
the growing heterogeneity of the Eurozone. Therefore, its improvement should be 
given a serious thought  especially because of the recent  growth of Eurosceptism 
which has discouraged the citizens to take advantage of the freedom of movement 
(Krause et al., 2017; Ritzen and Kahanec, 2017; Huart and Tchakpalla, 2019). In fact, 
the problem is that the Eurozone seems to lack extensive decision-making power 
concerning monetary policy, that would equally benefit all the member states.  The 
significance of this literature review lies thus in determining the true impact intra-EU 
labor mobility has on the EMU and how the time of recovery from a future economic 
shock, which would shake the state of the Eurozone, could be reduced. The focus is 
hence be on the importance of labor mobility as a factor in the longevity and effective 
operation of the EMU.
The structure is as follows: section two examines the position of labor mobility as a 
cornerstone of the EMU in terms of the theory of optimum currency areas (Mundell, 
1961), and whether the Eurozone should be considered an optimum currency area 
today. Section three discusses the role of labor mobility in stabilizing the economy 
and asymmetries of the Eurozone’s economies, acknowledging the recent EU-wide 
trends in the movement of labor. Section four highlights the role of the movement of 
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labor during the Eurozone crisis, from which a number of the member states are still  
in recovery. Taking into account that labor was not mobile enough during the crisis 
(Jones et al., 2016), section five examines the barriers that kept the European labor 
force from moving. The different barriers are concentrated on, and methods to further 
incentivize European labor mobility are discussed. The barriers are roughly divided 
into cultural and administrative, observing the recent Eurosceptic attitudes and the 
impact of them on labor mobility as an increasing trend. The sixth section discusses 
the longevity of the EMU, as recent research represents many different views about 
it. It thus estimates the implications made on the EMU’s future. A brief summary and 
conclusion are provided in section seven. Lastly, section eight provides a conceptual 
framework assessing the role of the free movement of labor in the EMU, analyzing 
the findings made in this literature review.
9
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The European Union is an economic union i.e. common market with a customs union 
offering its citizens the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. In 
1999, the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU was established, and eleven 
member states took a step forward in integration. Today, 19 of the 28 EU member 
states  share  a  common  monetary  policy  and  currency,  the  euro  (European 
Commission,  2019).  This  integration  further  increased  the  importance  of  the 
movement of labor to the EMU which gives the right to work and reside anywhere in 
the EU without a work permit (Krause et al., 2017). It is defined as one of the most  
significant channels with which country-specific economic shocks are absorbed in a 
currency area (EMU) (Basso et al., 2019). The movement of labor in currency areas 
is quite often discussed through the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA), which 
was first described by Mundell (1961). The ideal question behind the OCA theory has 
been whether a common monetary policy would be feasible for the member states of 
the European Economic Community (the predecessor of the European Union).  In 
other  words,  Mundell  (1961)  developed  the  theory  of  optimum  currency  areas 
according to which the area that would share a common currency should have a 
large, mobile, and integrated labor market with flexibility in pricing and wages in order  
to sustain both labor and capital mobility. In addition to factor mobility, an OCA would 
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have  similar  business  cycles  and  thus,  a  centralized  budget  to  balance  the 
asymmetry of the economies. 
Labor mobility is seen as an essential element of the OCA and thus, it is ought to be 
considered as a central function of the EMU’s effective operation. In relation to an 
economic union, it can be seen as a method of adjusting to asymmetric economic 
shocks  in  the  currency  area,  that  are  defined  by  Jager  and  Hafner  (2013)  as 
economic  shocks  in  which  the  impact  on  the  currency  union’s  member  states’ 
economies  differs  widely.  Indeed,  labor  mobility  is  an  adjustment  mechanism 
especially as the Eurozone member states have been proven to respond to national 
differences in unemployment during economic crises better than the rest of the EU 
(European Commission, 2014; Huart and Tchakpalla, 2019). This therefore shows 
that the Eurozone member states’ labor force answers better to asymmetries and the 
movement of labor functions as a stabilizer to a greater extent. The heterogeneity of 
the Eurozone’s member states is quite evident, and the monetary union thus needs 
the movement of labor to better adjust to asymmetric shocks. De Grauwe (2013) 
points out that labor mobility is one of the only methods of internal devaluation for the 
Eurozone in the absence of a unified fiscal policy. Even if the movement of labor is 
not  the  only  element  for  an  effective  OCA,  it  may  be  considered  as  the  most 
important  one  for  its  abilities  to  stabilize  unemployment  differences  around  the 
currency area.
Considering  the  other  elements  of  the  OCA,  the  different  member  states  having 
similar business cycles, in addition to labor mobility, is another means of absorbing 
asymmetric shocks. Similar business cycles form as a result of economic integration 
by increasing trade and financial linkages (Azcona, 2019). However, even though in 
theory, the similarity of business cycles is seen as feasible, Jager and Hafner (2013) 
point  out  that  differences  in  business  cycles  are,  however,  considerable  in  the 
Eurozone by displaying enormous differences in for example the average income 
levels of different member states. Lacking similar business cycles has the potential to 
make the EMU very fragile if the movement of labor stays insufficient. Flexibility both 
in prices and wages is needed in order to sustain the movement of both capital and 
labor in the OCA. Krugman (2012) states that prices and wages are quite far from 
flexible in the Eurozone, and changes to relative prices and wages should rather be 
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made through devaluation than renegotiating contracts. Yet, the possibility of fiscal 
integration  in  the  Eurozone  is  seen  quite  distant  today  (Dustmann  and  Preston, 
2019). The OCA theory proposes a centralized budget to balance the asymmetries of 
the  currency  area  in  order  to  redistribute  capital  to  areas  which  have  perhaps 
suffered from low mobility of labor and capital.  The ideas of the introduction of a 
common fiscal policy are somewhat consistent with the notion of the redistribution of 
capital.  However,  it  is  politically  fairly  difficult  to  accomplish  due  to  the  differing 
opinions of the member states considering the further capital redistribution to areas 
having  suffered  economically  the  most  (Frieden  and  Walter,  2017).  Although  all  
elements of the OCA are very important, Krugman (2012) proposes labor mobility to 
be the most essential element for a currency area to adjust to asymmetries in the 
economy.
The question on why EU citizens do not take advantage of the free movement of  
labor is likely to be posed when examining the Eurozone through the OCA theory. 
Jager and Hafner (2013)  point out that when first created, the EMU was thought to 
further the European integration process and thus, eventually transform the Eurozone 
into an OCA even if not being one when the EMU was founded.  Schwartz (2014) 
claims that the Eurozone has never been an OCA as it lacks the macro-economic 
infrastructure which has been shown through the internal tensions between member 
states.  Yet,  Krause  et  al.  (2014)  point  out  that  before  the  Eurozone  crisis,  the 
member states were much more stable and similar in terms of their economies than 
what they now are. It is quite clear that the asymmetric economic shocks have drifted 
the euro much further from being an OCA. Until this day, it is debated, whether the 
EMU ever filled these four criteria in 1992.
The possibility of full employment is discussed by Ritzen and Zimmermann (2018) 
who show that still today, a full European employment policy would be feasible even 
though great reforms would be needed. In addition, even if the movement of labor 
has not been sufficient during the asymmetric economic crises, D’Amuri  and Peri 
(2014)  show how the share of foreign-born in the EU’s working age population has 
kept growing even though the demand of labor fell dramatically when the EU was 
facing  the  consequences  of  the  Eurozone  crisis.  However,  many  agree  that  the 
movement of labor in the Eurozone is still limited today and thus, it cannot be referred 
8
to as an optimum currency area  (Krugman, 2012; De Grauwe, 2013; Jones et al., 
2016;  Berger  et  al.,  2019).  This  knowledge is  prone to  raise concerns regarding 
recovery from a future asymmetric shock. A need for reforms, thus, exists to bring the 
Eurozone closer to being an OCA.
9
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In the EMU, labor mobility is an important means of stabilizing the economy, and 
literature widely agrees that is should be used to a further extent in order to better 
balance demand and supply shocks of  labor (Jager  and Hafner,  2013;  European 
Commission, 2014; Zaiceva, 2014; Basso et al., 2019). Labor mobility is clearly a 
growing trend in the EU and offers both the sending and receiving countries a win-
win situation.  Zaiceva (2014)  emphasizes that  migration has the ability to  absorb 
excess labor force in sending countries and thus it contributes to an overall lowered 
unemployment. This has been the case especially when observing the newer EU 
member  states.  However,  the  southern  members  of  the  Eurozone  have,  mostly 
because  of  the  Eurozone  crisis,  faced  extremely  high  unemployment  which, 
according to Krause et al. (2014) is taking the EU further away from an integrated 
single market which is a central component of an economic union. Literature does 
acknowledge  the  asymmetry  present  in  the  European  economy  and  generally 
proposes labor mobility to be one of the most essential economic stabilizers for the 
Eurozone. Thus far, even if it is not at a level significant enough, it is still seen as a 
trend that has the potential to facilitate a faster method for the EMU to recover from a 
future asymmetric shock (Arpaia et al., 2016; Krause et al., 2017; Basso et al., 2019).
In the case of an economic shock, migrants tend to be more mobile than natives in 
terms of labor which helps the economy to stabilize according Basso et al. (2019). 
They found that the areas with low presence of migrants are more prone to shocks in 
terms of unemployment. This promotes the idea that migration of labor force is a win-
win for both sending and receiving countries if is present in the area. This knowledge 
should bring the decision-makers of the EU motivation to further encourage labor 
mobility to regions where the shares of migrants are insignificant. D’Amuri and Peri 
(2014) take this idea even further by proving that migration pushes natives towards 
9
more complex jobs,  and thus,  their  study proves a null  impact  of  immigration on 
natives’ employment. This implies that we can, in an environment with a quite flexible 
labor market,  rule out the negative effects of  labor mobility  even though it  would 
represent the best-case scenario. And even if, from a macroeconomic point of view, 
labor mobility shows a win-win situation in the case of the EMU, Hasselbalch (2019) 
shows a different perspective and brings out the loss of human capital for the sending 
countries as a major issue for EU member states that have faced large numbers of  
emigrating labor force. He explains the insignificant reforms reflecting brain drain by a 
 reaction of the Eurozone crisis implying that reforms take place only 
after several years after the initial reactions were taken to the economic shock. In the 
sense of research of the impact of labor mobility on the EMU, the possible reforms 
made to decrease brain drain, would have complicated the mobility of labor in the 
EU, and thus, this research. Yet, the benefits of return migration are, more often than 
not,  shown to  outweigh the  costs  of  brain  drain  (Zaiceva,  2014;  Zapata-Barrero, 
2016; Dustmann and Preston, 2019). 
The fact that labor mobility absorbs 25 per cent of asymmetric economic shocks, is 
implied by research (European Commission, 2014; Arpaia et al., 2016). Even though 
labor mobility in the EU still is marginal, citizens of another EU member state make 
about 4,2 per cent of the people employed in the EU (European Commission, 2020). 
The stabilizing effects of this low intra-EU mobility percentage seem to have been 
significant considering its estimated consequences on absorption of up to a quarter of  
an asymmetric economic shock. The opinions of labor mobility being a good method 
of stabilizing the economy in the Eurozone, vary from country to country, even when 
interviewing  labor  economists  (Krause  et  al.,  2017).  The  Southern  European 
respondents were generally more pessimistic about the functioning of the EU, and 
often expressed a need for an EU-wide welfare system in order  to decrease the 
asymmetry and further stabilize the economy. It is not surprising, that the economic 
state a country is in, affects the opinions of everyone on the functioning of the EMU 
and the extent, to which labor mobility can absorb shocks. Research shows clearly a 
need for a more integrated EU in terms of labor mobility as this is able to stabilize the  
economy in a significant way. Huart  and Tchakpalla (2019) support the idea of a 
more  integrated  Eurozone  in  terms  of  labor  mobility  but  acknowledge  the 
unsurprising fact that countries with lower unemployment rates and higher average 
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wages are expected to have higher net inflows of migrants.  This can be seen as 
something  that  has  the  ability  widen  the  regional  income  disparities,  which  can 
increase the heterogeneity of the euro area’s economies. 
The free movement of labor in the EU has not only improved the opportunities for an 
individual but also for the Eurozone’s stability.  In addition to absorbing asymmetric 
shocks in the Eurozone, labor mobility has been shown to improve a more efficient 
matching of skills to positions (Eichengreen et al., 2014; Zaiceva, 2014). At the same 
time however, many migrants, especially from the EU-12, are working in positions 
they are overqualified for (Kahanec and Guzi, 2017). One could easily think that the 
‘down skilling’  of  migrants  would lead to  them not  making a living that  would be 
considerably different from that in the country of origin. Yet, Elsner (2013) proves an 
average  wage  increase  of  6,6  per  cent  for  Lithuanian  migrants  who,  after  the 
enlargement migrated mostly to the UK and Ireland. He still takes into account that 
immigrant and migrant workers are indeed overrepresented in low-skill occupations 
even if their level of education would be higher. The general positive effect on wages 
and higher chances of employment are more often than not, incentives for migration 
and are likely be the most important ones in the future as well considering intra-EU 
migration.
Mundell’s (1961) views were quite Keynesian and hence, he wanted to make sure 
that in the process of letting go of their monetary sovereignty adopting a common 
currency,  the  member  states  would  have  methods  of  adjusting  to  asymmetric 
economic  shocks.  As  devaluation  of  the  currency  would  no  longer  be  a  way  of 
adjusting to asymmetric economic shocks, the labor markets would have to be very 
mobile and integrated. The role of the theory of optimum currency areas did not have 
a central role in determining how the EMU would work as the decision-makers leaned 
on monetarism at the time of foundation and thought the theory was irrelevant (De 
Grauwe,  2013).  It  is,  however  agreed  that  the  growth  of  labor  mobility  in  the 
Eurozone would positively affect its integration (Kahanec et al., 2016; Krause et al., 
2017).  Taken  into  account  the  positive  correlation  between  labor  mobility  and 
economic  integration,  it  seems bizarre  that  the  decision-makers  of  the  European 
Union in  1992 did  not  put  as  much emphasis  on  labor  mobility  as they perhaps 
should have when founding the EMU. 
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Literature generally agrees that the decision-makers of the EU widely relied on the 
notion that economic integration is automatically followed by increased welfare, when 
founding the EMU. However, it is quite clear that it is not on the level one would 
expect from a fully integrated monetary union. Arpaia et al. (2016) agree that even if 
labor mobility has constantly been increasing over the years, its magnitude is not 
sufficient for the Eurozone to be considered an OCA. Overall, however, it is clear that 
EU labor mobility is on an upward trend. The development is quite slow, but migration 
also from non-EU member states has improved the situation in the European labor 
market (European Commission, 2019). The recent development shows that the EMU 
does need reforms to find concrete ways to increase the extent to which countries 
can internally devaluate the euro. Furthermore, Kahanec and Zimmermann (2016) 
propose  for  example  EU-wide  recognition  of  professional  qualifications  and  a 
legislative  framework  for  cross-border  employment.  These  reforms  would  be 
implemented by the whole of the EU; furthermore, they would increase the role of  
labor mobility and therefore, ensure the EMU’s more effective operation. 
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The Great  Recession of 2008 that  begun from Wall  Street  affected almost  every 
economy of the world in some way. Yet, economies of multiple countries recovered in 
a decent amount of time, which was not the case for the Eurozone with a common 
monetary policy and very little methods for internal devaluation. However, some of 
the economic shock was absorbed by  the free movement of labor in the Eurozone 
which responded quite well to national differences in unemployment rates during the 
crisis (Huart and Tchakpalla, 2019). It is widely shown that the Eastern Enlargements 
of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 had a positive effect on labor mobility during 
the Eurozone crisis as labor force from the new EU member states was generally  
more mobile than from the old member states (Arpaia et al., 2016; Kahanec et al., 
2016; Kahanec and Guzi, 2017; Basso et al., 2019). Again, the movement of labor is 
something  that  should  be  further  considered  by  the  European  decision  makers. 
Furthermore, lesser amounts of labor mobility are correlated with economic shocks 
12
having stronger effects on the economies of certain Eurozone member states which 
is discussed by Basso et al.  (2019).  During the Eurozone crisis,  literature overall  
agrees that the EU and non-EU labor force was mobile and helped the EMU absorb 
the economic shock to some extent, but it clearly was not sufficient as some of the  
southern member states of the Eurozone such as Spain and Greece are still in the 
process of recovery.
Before the Eastern Enlargements, the governments of the EU member states (EU-
15) were concerned about a mass-migration from the new member states after the 
enlargement leading to a race to the bottom, and put transitional periods of as long 
as seven years restricting labor mobility from the new member states (Gajevska, 
2006).  These  transitional  periods  came  to  an  end  about  at  the  time  when  the 
Eurozone crisis began which has been shown to have a positive effect in terms of 
intra-EU labor mobility. Kahanec and Zimmermann (2016) show that since 2004, 1,8 
per  cent  of  the  population  of  the  ‘new member  states’  have  migrated  to  EU-15. 
However, the macroeconomic impact of this migration has been quite low. Yet, some 
member states of the EU faced quite large inflows of migrants throughout the 2010s. 
For example, out of the whole German population, migrants make up about 9,05 per 
cent  (Zapata-Barrero,  2016) and this  furthermore shows how Germany especially 
became a hotspot for intra-EU migration when the transitional period it had set on the 
new  member  states’  labor  force  came  to  an  end  in  2011.  In  addition,  non-EU 
migration has significantly grown in dimension throughout the years (Kahanec and 
Zimmermann, 2016).   Furthermore, the numbers should be larger today. It  would 
seem that  the  mobility  of  labor  helped the  absorption  of  economic  shocks,  even 
though the amount was quite insignificant when observing the bigger picture, and that 
is what caused the EMU to almost break down. D’Amuri and Peri (2014) agree that 
during  the  Eurozone  crisis,  the  shares  of  migrants  and  immigrants  have  grown 
although the demand for labor significantly decreased at the same time.  When the 
recovery  from  the  Eurozone  crisis  began,  the  Eurozone  was  quite  swift  in  its 
movements to create new reforms which are thought to help the recovery from future 
asymmetric economic shocks. 
Since the EMU was founded, ideas on developing fiscal integration in the Eurozone 
have been around to further the stabilization of the European economy during an 
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asymmetric  shock.  The  heterogeneity  of  the  member  states’  economies  was 
considerable already before the Eurozone crisis. Eichengreen et al. (2014) state that 
some countries’ governments had significant fiscal excesses and imbalances already 
before the crisis. And when the crisis was upon the Eurozone, the recovery process 
was thus even more difficult for these member states. The extremely slow recovery 
from the Eurozone crisis has left many hoping for the member states to take a step 
further in the fiscal integration process (Kundera, 2014; Jones et al. 2016; Frieden 
and Walter, 2017; Berger et al., 2019).  Even though research seems quite certain 
that integration to a fiscal union would be feasible, it would be politically quite hard to  
achieve due to the different social structures in the different member states of the 
Eurozone. The notion of fiscal integration being politically a sensitive issue is taken 
into  account  by  research surprisingly  little.  Dustmann and Preston (2019)  take a 
different stance to the question on the need of a fiscal union by pointing out that more 
similarity  is  needed in  order  to  increase the mobility  of  labor  as that  would  help 
economies fill demand gaps for labor. Even though supportive of the idea of a fiscal 
union, Frieden and Walter (2017) recognize the unwillingness of the surplus countries 
to the centralization of fiscal policy in the Eurozone. Considering that the fiscal union 
would be extremely difficult to implement due to differences in political stances, the 
movement of labor would be something the Eurozone should furthermore focus on.
Labor has been shown not to be mobile enough during the Eurozone crisis and the 
question on why that is remains to be fully answered. Jones et al. (2016) discuss how 
the member states were reluctant to make significant reforms and thus responded to 
the crisis with incomplete, minimal reforms. The Eurozone crisis has contributed to 
the tensions that have lately grown around the EMU. Berger et al. (2019) furthermore 
state the fact that indeed most of the burden was carried by the surplus countries’ 
taxpayers. De Grauwe (2013) adds that it has caused the surplus countries to start 
lacking trust on the crisis swept ones.  The lack of trust and unevenness in bearing 
the costs could be a feasible answer to the question but not enough to fill the gap in 
the knowledge on the question on why the free mobility of labor was not sufficient. 
During the crisis, labor mobility was higher in the Eurozone than it was before it, and 
individuals were further incentivized by the unemployment differentials between the 
member states of the Eurozone (European Commission, 2014). Yet, even though the 
supply  of  labor  rose  during  the  Eurozone  crisis,  the  demand  faced  a  dramatic 
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downfall. Arpaia et al. (2016) focus as well on the long-term benefits of the movement 
of labor by utilizing a vector autoregression to prove that the effects of labor demand 
shocks are transitory when firms and labor are mobile enough. It is important to note 
that the euro area’s labor force was more mobile than the EU’s as a whole.
The dramatic decrease of the demand of labor has led to significant unemployment, 
especially  for  the  youth  in  the  countries  that  were  hit  hardest  by  the  crisis.  A 
comparison  of  Ghosray  et  al.  (2016)  for  example  shows  how  Spain’s  youth 
unemployment has more than doubled from the time the EMU was founded. The 
striking increase of youth unemployment in the member states of the Eurozone that 
suffered from the crisis the most, further shows what Jones et al. (2016) meant by 
minimal reforms during the crisis in order to encourage the European labor force to 
move. Although, almost all of the Eurozone’s member states implemented some sort  
of program for the training of the unemployed (European Central Bank, 2012). These 
reforms were quite minimal,  as some member states are yet to  recover from the 
Eurozone  crisis.  It  still  needs  to  be  taken  into  account  that  labor  force  was  not  
immobile during the crisis as Zaiceva (2014) pointed out that most of the migrants 
were young and their skills ranged from low to intermediate. Yet, it needs to be noted 
that  low-skilled,  temporary,  and  young  workers  were  the  most  affected  by  the 
Eurozone crisis (European Central Bank, 2012). The mobility of labor force affected 
most by the economic shock should be considered a likely effect and thus, it is not  
surprising that literature discusses it quite a lot. A situation in which the demand and 
supply of labor are far from equilibrium, certainly causes additional barriers to the 
mobility of labor. It is well noted that European labor markets and wages should have 
been  more  flexible  during  the  asymmetric  economic  shock  (De  Grauwe,  2013; 
European Commission, 2014). However, at the moment, youth unemployment is one 
of  the  most  substantial  problems  the  EU  is  facing  to  which  Kahanec  and 
Zimmermann (2016) recommend changing EU law in a way that could deepen the 
integration  process  which  would  as  a  consequence,  lead  to  an  increase  in  the 
mobility of labor inside the EU.
15
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Even if the decision to migrate into another EU member state can result a win-win 
situation for not only the migrant,  but to  the sending and receiving countries, the 
decision  to  leave  one’s  own country  is  all  but  easy  for  the  individual.  However, 
Krause et al. (2017) show that on a microeconomic level, the migration decision is an 
investment as when the net gain from migrating exceeds the gain of not moving it is 
automatically seen as something that encourages the movement of labor. Even if the 
European Union offers its citizens the free movement of labor, this still  has many 
barriers that can, to an extent, restrict mobility. For example, same kinds of barriers 
tend not to exist in the USA to the same extent as in Europe. Basso et al. (2019) 
present  examples  such  as  the  imperfect  transferability  of  skills  and  professional 
qualifications from one member state to  another,  language barriers,  and different 
regulations  in  social  security.  Thus,  the  barriers  could  roughly  be  divided  into 
administrative and cultural ones. These barriers have often caused the ‘down skilling’ 
of foreign labor force which is seen especially clearly in the member states that have 
joined the EU after the Eastern Enlargement in 2004 (Elsner, 2013; Zaiceva, 2014; 
Dustmann and Preston, 2019). Elsner (2013) adds that migrants are overrepresented 
in occupations that require a low level of skills even if their level of education and 
knowledge would be much higher. Further research should be conducted on the topic 
of down skilling of migrant labor force taking into account that it generally is more 
elastic than native labor force.
Although the EU member states are quite similar in terms of their legal structures, the 
cultural barriers are the hardest to eliminate. According to Kahanec et al. (2016) there 
is almost nothing decision makers can do about the cultural barriers as the EU is  
culturally  extremely  diverse.  Yet,  what  incentivizes  the  migrants  most  are  the 
increased opportunities due to a possibility to a higher standard of living (Elsner,  
2013;  D'Amuri  et  al.,  2014;  Zapato-Barrera,  2016).  The Eastern  Enlargements  of 
2004 and 2007 clearly demonstrate that the cultural barriers in Europe tend to lose 
their significance which Popescu and Alpopi (2017) prove by showing an increase in 
both employment and participation rates around the EU. Zaiceva (2014) agrees and 
states that this was partially a result of Intra-EU migration. Today, the EU is getting 
more  and  more  connected  which  can  absolutely  lower  the  cultural  barriers  for 
migration  in  the  EU,  and thus benefit  the  EMU.  Many EU decision-makers  were 
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anticipating a race to the bottom when the Eurozone took its first steps in 1999. This 
fear  was  also  addressed  by  Krueger  (2000)  who  yet  supported  the  idea  of  an 
increased mobility of labor to enhance the Eurozone’s economic efficiency. Many of 
the initial fears of the decision makers of the EU had turned out to be unnecessary as 
research has clearly proven that the movement of labor increases both the wages of 
migrants and natives (D’Amuri and Peri, 2014; European Commission, 2014; Bertola, 
2016). The implications made by literature thus suggest a stronger integration and 
lowering of barriers still understanding that lowering the cultural barriers is quite an 
impossible task.
The Eurozone crisis not only raised the asymmetry and heterogeneity of the member 
states’ economies but also drew them further away from each other in a political 
sense. The public opinion towards the EU is a great barrier to labor mobility in the 
sense  that  it  affects  the  decision-making  to  an  extent  and  thus,  labor  policies 
(Gajevska, 2016). However, Krause et al.  (2017) found that by further integration, 
namely harmonizing social security systems in the EU, labor would be able to move 
more  efficiently  if  for  example  everyone  would  have  the  right  to  an  EU  wide 
‘unemployment insurance’. Jones et al. (2017) continue this discussion by expressing 
a need for a fully integrated Eurozone by implementing a common fiscal policy. Even 
though a complete fiscal integration might be difficult to achieve due to differentiating 
opinions  in  the  different  member  states,  some  extent  of  harmonization  of  social 
security would incentivize labor force to migrate.  In the light of the research of the 
impact  of labor mobility  on the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU, further 
integration would increase the mobility of labor and function as an economic stabilizer 
and shorten the recovery from a future asymmetric economic shock. Furthermore, 
the mobility of labor force in the EU is twice as inelastic as it is in the United States 
(Kundera, 2013). Even though the Eurozone crisis explains, to an extent, the public 
opinion that has affected the political state of the EU and thus, created more barriers 
though Eurosceptic attitudes, research implies that further integration to encourage 
migration would be needed.
Since the burden of the Eurozone crisis has been carried by the surplus countries’ 
taxpayers, the tensions and Eurosceptism that followed should not come as a big 
surprise. Schwartz (2014) recognizes that it is primarily the northern member states 
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of the EU that are reluctant to capitalize new crisis response agencies to help bail out  
the  peripheral  member  states;  Greece,  Spain,  and  Portugal  for  example.  The 
perceived  Eurosceptism  shows  thorough  some  of  the  northern  member  states’ 
concerns about ‘welfare migration’.  In 2013, the governments of the Netherlands, 
Germany,  Austria,  and  UK  raised  significant  concerns  in  a  public  letter  to  the 
European Commission (Krause et al., 2017). The concerns posed by some of EU’s 
surplus countries during the asymmetric economic shock are signs of discontent and 
disappointment of the EU and the Eurozone. If actions to depress the free mobility of 
labor would have been taken by the surplus countries, the shock-absorbing effects 
and the increasing trend of labor mobility (Arpaia et al., 2016; Kahanec and Guzi,  
2016; Basso et al., 2019; Huart and Tchakpalla, 2019) would have been reduced by 
quite a lot. The overall dissatisfaction with the EMU and EU’s actions is an important 
reason to  why concerns were raised about  the notion of ‘welfare shopping’.  This  
concern  does  not  take  into  account  the  benefits  the  mobility  of  labor  offers  the 
diverse economies of the Eurozone’s member states. Governments’ concerns should 
turn unnecessary, especially as the free movement of labor is vital for the EMU’s 
longevity especially at times of financial instability. 
Being regarded as one of the most important components of the Optimum Currency 
Area,  methods  of  internal  devaluation,  and  economic  stabilization  within  the 
European Union, labor mobility has some downsides to it. Most see brain drain as a 
potential  issue that  is  a  consequence of  an increased mobility  of  labor  (Zaiceva, 
2014; Zapata-Barrero, 2016). Hasselbalch (2019) on the other hand, sees it  as a 
policy issue only paid attention to long after looking for solutions to the existing crisis,  
and  not  taken  seriously  enough by  the  decision-makers  of  the  EU.  Many  of  the 
decision-makers in the eastern member states of the EU have arguably had doubts 
about brain drain being an issue. Elsner (2013) further shows a mass-migration of 
especially young Lithuanians to Ireland and the UK after the Eastern Enlargement 
took place in 2004 but yet, the overall unemployment rates of the newer member  
states have decreased since the enlargement. This development can be seen as a 
direct consequence of an increased intra-EU mobility of labor. In addition, the mobility  
of  skilled young labor force can solve demographic challenges in member states 
starting to experience the aging of the labor force (Zapata-Barrero, 2016; Krause et 
al.  2017).  However,  as  non-EU  migration  is  quite  similar  in  weight  to  intra-EU 
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migration (Arpaia et al. 2016; Basso et al., 2019) it would be expected to play a more 
significant  role  in  solving  demographic  challenges,  out  of  which  the  aging of  the 
European population can be considered as one of the most demanding ones. Gaps 
in  research  on  the  mobility  of  labor  in  the  EU exist  in  terms of  determining  the 
possible effects on solving demographic challenges with the mobility of labor taking 
into account the movement of EU and non-EU citizens. Hence, although the mobility 
of  labor has its threats,  the most important  one being the loss of human capital, 
research  quite  widely  agrees  that  even  though  it  is  a  threat  in  the  long  run, 
advantages of the mobility of labor outweigh the costs.
The administrative barriers would be the most essential to lower to incentivize the 
movement of labor. The transferability of qualifications has been shown as one of the  
key issues present in the EU (Krause et al, 2017) which has shown to be one reason 
why  many  migrants  are  employed  in  positions  that  do  not  match  their  skill-level 
(Elsner,  2013;  Kahanec  et  al.,  2016;  Kahanec  and  Guzi,  2017;  Dustmann  and 
Preston, 2019). Although the decision to migrate can be seen as an investment on 
the microeconomic level due to better opportunities to find employment and better 
wage than in the country of origin, employers not seriously taking into account the 
skill-level of the migrant implies certainly that further transparency in the transition of 
qualifications is needed. According to the study conducted by Krause et al. (2017) 
over 50 per cent of their respondents imply that reforms in order to help the mobility  
of labor develop should be implemented to reach a more unified European Union in 
terms of  public  opinion  and  most  importantly,  integration.  Syed  Zwick  and  Syed 
(2017) found that the EU is extremely heterogenic in  terms of their  labor market 
characteristics  but  yet,  the  member  states  of  the  Eurozone  proved  to  be  more 
homogenic than the EU as a whole. This proves that making EU-wide reforms would 
be very important, but however, deciding on what kinds of reforms are needed is 
almost  impossible  because  of  the  different  political  stances  throughout  the  EU. 
Overall, the main implications relevant to the study of the effect of labor mobility on 
the  EMU,  are  the  possible  reforms  concerning  a  more  unified  transition  of 
professional  qualifications  and  some  extent  of  fiscal  integration  implying  social 
security, in terms of perhaps an EU-wide ‘unemployment insurance’.
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The longevity of the EMU has been intensely debated ever since the Eurozone crisis 
took place and drove the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU to a point where it  
had to bail  countries out in order to avoid almost a bankruptcy of some member 
states. In 1992, when the foundations of the EMU were created, the decision-makers 
at the time were warned about the possibility of economic shocks in the future due to 
different business cycles and a lack of factor mobility but they assumed that the steps 
taken  in  the  integration  process  would  eventually  make  the  Eurozone  an  OCA 
(Azcona, 2019). The theory of Optimum Currency Areas was brought up much later 
when the Eurozone crisis took place, and research quite widely agrees that today, 
the currency area is quite far from being an OCA but the member states are too 
interdependent of each other to let the currency union fail (Krugman, 2012; Schwartz, 
2014;  Jones  et  al.,  2016;  Azcona,  2019).  The  discussion  of  Bertola  (2016) 
emphasizes how labor policies are a direct consequence of economic and financial 
integration to which the EU should aim at. Thus, the recent literature in both labor 
economics and political  economy sees the Euro as ‘a currency without a country 
standing behind it’. This is why this literature review considers further integration a 
necessity for the EMU to function in an effective way. However, the European Central  
Bank (2019) shows that unemployment around the Eurozone has decreased from 10 
per cent of the labor force in 2016 to 6,7 per cent in 2019. It is well-known that the  
movement of labor would eventually create a more integrated EMU. Schwartz (2014) 
argues  that  the  Eurozone  should  change  its  macroeconomic  positioning  as  it  is 
lacking  both  political  and  macroeconomic  infrastructures  to  operate  as  an 
international currency as the imbalances between the northern and southern member 
states are enormous. Many see that the Eurozone is almost doomed to fail due to its  
fragility  if  it  faces  a  crisis  as  severe  as  the  Eurozone crisis  was to  most  of  the 
Southern members of states. However, the lowering of EU-wide unemployment rates 
shows potential for a more effective functioning of the Eurozone.
The idea of ‘failing forward’ (Jones et al., 2016) is an appropriate way of describing 
the  actions  the  decision  makers  have  been  taking  by  not  being  willing  to  take 
responsibility of making these reforms. Not taking into account the vast possibilities 
the free mobility of labor in the EU offers as a method of internal devaluation and 
thus, economic stabilization, is a great mistake as it has the ability to absorb 25 per 
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cent of economic shocks in the EU (European Commission, 2014; Arpaia et al., 2016; 
Krause et al.,  2017).  This implies a need for action as it  is  a fact that without a 
national monetary policy, and very little means of common fiscal policy (the ESM and 
Growth  and  Stability  Pact),  the  EMU is  extremely  fragile  to  asymmetric  shocks. 
Research widely agrees that the movement of labor provides both the sending and 
the receiving countries a win-win situation as documented by Ritzen and Kahanec 
(2017) who see that in the future, what has a great potential to be a pull factor for  
intra-EU migration is primarily the increased opportunities in the labor market. 
If  reforms  suggested  by  research  would  be  implemented  to  further  drive  the 
economic  integration and thus, mobility of labor in the EU, the asymmetries of the 
euro area’s economies would start stabilizing. This stabilization brings the Eurozone 
closer to  being an OCA and should improve the overall  welfare of  the European 
citizens.  Furthermore,  Ritzen and Zimmermann (2018)  claim that  one day,  a  full 
European  employment  would  be  possible  to  reach  but  this  process  would  be 
extremely  slow.  However,  if  migration  is  incentivized,  in  addition  to  offering  an 
important  method  of  adjustment,  it  has  tremendous  opportunities  in  solving 
demographic issues in the EU, such as the aging of the working age population. 
Even if some research does so imply, the EMU should not be considered doomed to 
fail. For now, the primary method of adjustment in the EMU is labor mobility (Jager 
and Hafner, 2013) which is still lacking due to the supply of labor being quite inelastic 
in the short run. However, the major trend shows that the elasticity of low-educated 
labor  force  has  been  increasing  (D’Amuri  and  Peri,  2014).  And  even  during  the 
Eurozone crisis, labor force within the EU responded better to unemployment shocks, 
and the mobility of labor has been on an upward trend since, which Dustmann and 
Preston  (2019)  discuss  emphasizing  that  the  objections  concerning  migration  in 
receiving  countries  are  more  often  political  and  cultural  than  economic.   In  the 
economic sense, the movement of labor has more winners than losers. It  truly is 
bizarre, that when discussing the Eurozone crisis, and the methods of adjustment, 
Frieden and Walter (2017) do not cover the movement of labor force as a method of 
economic  adjustment  or  internal  devaluation.  Based  on  recent  literature,  the 
movement  of  labor  is  the  most  essential  method of  adjustment  in  the  European 
Union. Overall, the EMU is widely dependent on the mobility of labor. If it does not  
take action in further incentivizing labor mobility in the future, the Eurozone stays 
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fragile, and research does not indicate, whether the growing mobility of labor helps 
the  European  economy  recover  any  faster  than  from  the  previous  asymmetric 
shocks.  If  the  labor  force  would  be  more  mobile,  the  surplus  countries  of  the 
Eurozone would not have to be afraid of the taxpayers having to carry the burden of 
recovering  from  an  economic  shock.  Unquestionably,  the  EU  should  take  the 
integration further to reduce the asymmetry of the European economies. 
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To summarize, this review of recent literature revealed that the state of the Eurozone 
is  quite  fragile  at  the  moment,  but  potential  for  a  more  integrated  and  effective 
monetary union exists through the movement of labor. Labor mobility has been on an 
upward trend since the Eastern Enlargements of 2004 and 2007 but was not at a  
level significant enough to function to its full extent as a shock absorber during the 
Eurozone crisis. However, one simply cannot deny its abilities to absorb economic 
shocks and asymmetry around the euro area. During its foundation, the Eurozone 
was not an optimum currency area (OCA),  and the recent  economic crises have 
drifted it farther from being one. The integration towards advancing factor mobility is 
primarily what takes the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU closer to being an 
OCA. The integration needed to promote the movement of labor would largely be 
about lowering the administrative barriers in the EU for the movement of labor. In  
reality, lowering the barriers takes an extensive amount of time, but it should to be 
done as the movement of labor does provide a win-win situation for both the sending 
and receiving  countries.  One should  still  remember,  that  the  employment  rate  of 
those with a nationality of another EU member state is 78 per cent compared with 59 
per  cent  for  non-EU  citizens  (European  Commission,  2019).  Even  though  the 
migration of EU and non-EU citizens is proven to be similar in weight, the knowledge 
of a more assured employment should work as an incentive for migration for the 
citizens of the EU, especially when the Eurozone is hit by an economic shock. 
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This  research  compares  the  similarities  and  differences  in  the  labor  mobility  of 
Germany and Spain, two different member states of the EU that are both part of the 
Eurozone,  before,  during,  and  after  the  Eurozone  crisis  while  observing  general 
trends in the movement of labor in the EU member states. The qualitative research 
exploits both primary and secondary data.  The impact of labor mobility on the E(M)U 
is studied by analyzing and identifying the possibilities it can provide to the Eurozone.
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The primary data for this research was collected through interviewing four experts on 
the subject of labor mobility, representing three different member states of the EU, 
described below. Utilizing experts from the EU institutions in both decision-making 
and specialist  roles was done to  ensure the versatility  and trustworthiness of the 
data.  The  sampling  method  utilized  was  judgement  sample.  In  other  words,  the 
researcher looked for interviewees by contacting persons and EU institutions with 
generally  known  expertise  and  work  experience  in  relation  to  European  labor 
mobility. 
All the interviewees had a chance to preview the questions and to get prepared for 
the interview estimated to last a maximum of 20 minutes. The language of interview 
was  English  in  all  cases.  Three  interviews  were  conducted  via  phone.  One 
interviewee sent her answers via email due to time management issues concerning 
an interview.  The interview was structured;  hence,  all  participants were  asked to 
answer the following four questions:
1. The free mobility of labor has been said to be the most important method of
internal devaluation and stabilizer of economic shocks in the EMU. What are
the  benefits  of  an  increased  labor  mobility  in  the  euro  area?
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2.  Literature  proposes  many  kinds  of  reforms  to  be  implemented  to  further 
incentivize the movement of labor in the Eurozone. What kinds of reforms do 
you think would be required and feasible to further increase labor mobility?
3. The movement of labor in the EU is on an upward trend, what do you think will 
become the most important ‘pull-factor’ for migration in the EU in the future?
4. Can the mobility of  labor assure the longevity of the EMU and shorten the 
Eurozone’s  overall  recovery  from an economic  shock? Do you  think  labor 
mobility in the EU will reach a level significant enough to provide a decrease in 
the heterogeneity of the economies of the Eurozone in the future?
The characteristics of the interviewees were as follows:
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The interviews were then recorded and transcribed onto a Word document. Thematic 
analysis is utilized to identify and to discuss the findings made. 
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The secondary  data  was  collected  primarily  through  Eurostat,  maintained  by  the 
European Commission. The actions taken by Germany and Spain to recover from the 
Eurozone  crisis  are  highlighted  as  illustrative  examples  of  two  different  E(M)U 
member states belonging to the Eurozone. The reason these two member states 
were chosen for this research was their highly variable means to handle their national  
economic  recoveries.  The  employment  and  unemployment  rates  of  Spain  and 
Germany as well as inflows and outflows of labor are examined as major variables 
over  a  time  period  covering  1999  to  2019  by  examining  the  secondary  data 
obtainable. The prevailing macroeconomic situation is evaluated through this data. 
The secondary data is presented as it is. In other words, it is not manipulated in any 
way keeping hence this research qualitative. 
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This case study was conducted in the following way. First, the situation regarding the 
mobility  of  labor  before  the  Eurozone  crisis  in  Germany  and  Spain  is  analyzed 
through comparison. Second,  the Eurozone crisis is analyzed in the two member 
states through discussing the movement of labor. Third, the economic recovery and 
current  situation  in  both  countries  is  discussed  through  highlighting  the  main 
opportunities for intra-EU labor mobility to solve issues. The secondary data in the 
countries of  interest  (i.e.  the statistical  data  publicly  available  from the European 
Commission  and European  Central  bank)  and other  data  provided  by  secondary 
literature search are used in order to find answers to the study objectives. Amongst 
secondary  data  provided  by  various  EU  institutions,  this  case  study  evaluates 
secondary data some of which has been reviewed in the previous section. This data 
is compared, in the discussion section, to the primary data obtained by interviewing 
experts  working  for  the  EU to  see  whether  the  case  study  concerning  only  two 
member states, Germany and Spain, might apply throughout the Eurozone. 
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The  methodology  chosen  for  this  research  is,  as  always  in  academic  research, 
restrained by limitations. Primarily, the number of interviewees was limited, and the 
process of searching for those working closely with the issue of labor mobility in the 
EU was  time-consuming  and  arbitrary  due  to  the  sampling  method  chosen.  The 
language chosen for the interview was English, which may have caused a language 
barrier  as  none  of  the  interviewees  was  a  native  English  speaker.  One  of  the 
interviewees  answered  the  questions  in  writing  via  email  which  limits  the 
extensiveness of the answers given. In addition to other limitations concerning the 
primary data collection, it needs to be noted that four interviewees, although being 
experts in their own areas, cannot give answers that would be fully representative of 
the situation of the EMU as a whole or all its different member states.  
Secondly, the complete data available from Eurostat’s labor force survey is not open 
without a specific permission which was not acquired for the research of this thesis. 
This research was limited by the generality of the data available to a large extent. As 
the case study was conducted utilizing only secondary research, the exact magnitude 
of labor mobility has been extremely hard to assess as a consequence of data being 
mostly  descriptive.  However,  the  findings  are  justified  with  the  volume  of  data 
acquired by conducting both primary and secondary research. 
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Germany  and  Spain,  as  the  first  and  third  most  common  receiving  countries  of 
migrants in the EU in 2018 (European Commission, 2020), respectively, have taken 
extremely different measures to recover from the Eurozone crisis. Labor mobility in 
the countries of interest before, during, and after the Eurozone crisis is assessed 
thoroughly in this case study.  These two member states of the EMU and thus, the 
Eurozone, both belong to the EU-15, i.e. the countries that joined the EU before the  
2004 Eastern Enlargement. The extensive differences in these countries’ economies 
can be partially explained with the fact that Germany is the ‘heart’ of the Eurozone 
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known to have a strong economy. Spain, on the other hand is a peripheral member 
state  of  the  Eurozone  having  had  relatively  high  unemployment  rates  for  both 
nationals  and  intra-EU migrants  throughout  the  period  of  time  assessed.  As  the 
literature reviewed above points out, the transitional periods, that came to an end two 
and seven years after the enlargements for Spain and Germany, respectively, have 
increased intra-EU labor mobility which has promoted the economic recovery from 
the Eurozone crisis. 
The most significant flows of intra-EU labor mobility could be divided in three parts: 1) 
the initial flows following the Eastern Enlargements of 2004 and 2007, 2) the reaction 
of  labor  force  to  the  Eurozone  crisis,  and  finally  3)  the  flows  stimulated  by  the 
economic growth and increased demand of labor. This comparison of labor mobility 
between Germany and Spain is constructed in the following manner: first, similarities 
and  differences  in  labor  mobility  were  found  in  both  member  states  before  the 
Eurozone crisis. Second, actions taken to encourage labor mobility and economic 
recovery  during  the  Eurozone  crisis  were  discovered  to  be  very  different  in  the 
member states of interest. Last, the extent of labor mobility during the recovery from 
the crisis turned out to be again, quite different between the two selected member 
states, that today, are among the most significant receiving countries of migrants. 
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In 2009, the employment rate of nationals compared to intra-EU migrants was greater 
in  both  countries  of  interest,  nationals’  employment  being  0,9  and  5,6  per  cent 
greater than that of intra-EU migrants’ in Spain and Germany, respectively (European 
Commission, 2019). However, both countries had implemented transitional periods 
for migrants coming from Romania and Bulgaria  which both joined the European 
Union in 2007.   Rodriguez-Planas and Farré (2016)  have described that before the 
crisis most of the migrants in Spain were Romanian, Bulgarian, and Polish despite 
the transitional periods, which restricted the movement of Romanians and Bulgarians 
until the 1st January 2009. Furthermore, they  have  shown that the average annual 
inflow of migrants to Spain was around 500 000 before the Eurozone crisis. Before 
the crisis,  Spain’s  public  debt  was low compared to  the country’s  GDP, and the 
unemployment  rate  was  kept  quite  low  thanks  to  a  trend  of  making  temporary 
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employment  contracts  (Fishman,  2012;  International  Labor  Organization,  2015). 
Overall,  the  movement  of  labor  to  Spain  was  considerable  already  before  the 
Eurozone  crisis,  and  the  country’s  economy  was  in  an  economic  bubble  which 
reflects the low unemployment rate of Spain at that time. 
Despite  the  transitional  period  of  seven  years  with  restrictions  in  labor  mobility, 
Germany encountered an increased labor mobility from the ‘new’ EU member states 
in  the  years  prior  to  the  Eurozone  crisis.  Taken  that  Germany  belongs  to  the 
wealthiest member states of the EU and has relatively high wages from a general  
European perspective, makes it a common receiving country of Intra-EU labor force. 
The  inflation  rates  of  the  Eurozone  were  quite  heterogenous  already  before  the 
Eurozone  crisis  affecting  prices  and  thus,  stimulating  labor  flows.  Furthermore, 
between 1998 and 2007, Frieden and Walter (2017) found that inflation in Germany 
averaged 1,5 per cent while it was around 3,2 per cent in Spain and caused large 
divergence in wages. The German labor-market institutions enforced wage restraint 
which was not the case in Spain. Furthermore, they show that unit labor costs in 
Germany decreased by 4,9 per cent while in Spain they rose by 30,4 per cent before  
the crisis. 
The increased cost of  labor,  and the relatively low discount rate of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) at the time, can be seen behind the economic bubble which was 
one of the key factors behind the stimulation of the Eurozone crisis throughout the 
Eurozone.  A contributing  factor  to  why Spain was not  prepared  for  an  economic 
shock, was the lack of implementation of institutional reforms related to labor force. 
Spain could have implemented reforms at the time of adopting the common currency 
in 1999,  in order to be capable of  stabilizing the economy in the lack of a national 
monetary policy. Germany, by contrast, had implemented the act on part-time work 
and fixed term employment relationships in late 2000 followed by the Hartz-reforms 
(Goshray  et  al.,  2016)  which  have  played  a  significant  role  in  keeping  the 
unemployment  rate  low throughout  the  2000s.  Taken into  account  the  significant 
divergences in the labor mobility reforms implemented before the Eurozone crisis as 
well as the divergence in the economies of the countries of interest, the strong and 
persistent asymmetric reaction to an economic shock is quite unsurprising.
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Figure 4.1 clearly shows that the inflows to Spain were increasing already before the 
crisis. Romanians formed the principal group of intra-EU migrants coming to Spain as 
the number of them grew exponentially during the 2000s peaking at around 2011. It 
is worth noting that the increase of Romanian migrants got swifter after it joined the 
EU in 2007 despite the transitional period of two years Spain introduced for restricting 
the inflow of labor of Romanians and Bulgarians. Rodriguez-Planas and Farré (2016) 
have  pointed out that in Spain, Romanians made up the second largest group of 
immigrants  covering  11  per  cent  of  the  immigrant  population  in  Spain  after  the 
enlargement. Despite the fact that hiring workers on a temporary basis was extremely 
common before the Eurozone crisis, the low unemployment rate was explained by 
the real-estate bubble which initiated the economic shock (Fishman 2012). 
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When the EU enlargements took place, Elsner and Zimmermann (2016) showed that 
due to the transitional periods of 7 years for both EU-8 and EU-2 migrants restricting 
mobility of labor to Germany, most of the post-enlargement migration was directed 
towards for example Ireland and the UK. The inflows from the new member states of 
the EU to Germany, similarly to Spain, increased despite the transitional periods. The 
inflows  from Poland  to  Germany  in  the  period  between  2000  and  2011  are  the 
greatest  out  of  all  intra-EU inflows to  Germany.  The impact  of  restrictions to  the 
number of inflows from Poland and the EU-2 in 2004 and 2007, respectively, was 
30
quite marginal which can be noted from Figure 4.2. The number of Polish migrants 
peaked right before the Eurozone crisis took place in the German market in 2009. 
However, Zimmermann and Elsner (2016) emphasize that the stability of the German 
labor market was one of the important pull factors to the mobility of labor both from in  
and outside of the EU. Hence, one can notice that the employment rate of intra-EU 
migrants in Germany is higher than in many other countries of the Eurozone, having 
been 70,2% in 2009 (European Commission, 2020).
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Overall,  labor  mobility  in both cases was on an upward trend already before the 
Eurozone crisis took place. In Spain, Romanians were the most significant group of 
intra-EU migrants as their mobility grew from about 8000 in 2000 to 800 000 in 2011. 
In Germany, the Polish were the most significant group of intra-EU migrants before 
the  crisis  as  Figure  4.2  shows.  In  the  case of  Germany,  the  transitional  periods 
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resulted  in  slight  deceleration  of  the  mobility  of  the  migrants  from  the  new  EU 
member states excluding Polish mobility. In Spain, the transitional periods had little 
influence on the Romanian inflows. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Germany was 
an intriguing destination country also for PIIGS (Figure 4.2). 
As  described  above,  extremely  divergent  wages  and  thus,  prices  around  the 
Eurozone  before  the  economic  shock,  and  opportunities  for  a  more  secure 
employment and better wage functioned as pull-factors for migration especially to 
economically stable Germany. However, also Spain was, before the Eurozone crisis,  
a  very  common  receiving  country  of  migrants  as  the  unemployment  rate  was 
seemingly low due to a real-estate bubble in the economy. The divergence of the 
Spanish and German economies was thus quite evident. The stability of the German 
economy has been considered as one of the reasons Germany recovered from the 
economic  shock  without  a  significant  increase  in  unemployment  (Elsner  and 
Zimmermann,  2016)  whereas  Spain’s  unemployment  rate  increased  substantially 
creating  significant  youth  unemployment  to  which  the  EU  is  still  trying  to  find 
solutions. For example, one can notice (Figure 4.3) that the labor market reforms 
implemented in the early 2000s in Germany have since then steadily lowered the 
unemployment  rate.  The  opposite  effect  is  seen  in  Spain’s  case  which  did  not 
implement any significant labor market reforms upon adopting the common currency 
in 1999. 
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Even though the unemployment rate in Spain increased substantially and the net 
inflows of intra-EU migrants decreased during the crisis, the asymmetric economic 
shock  did  not  create  the  problems  in  Spain’s  economy  (Fishman,  2012).  These 
problems were  already present  before  the  Eurozone crisis  and worsened as  the 
amount of debt increased. In 2011, Spain reintroduced the restrictions onto the free 
movement  of  Romanian  workers  due  to  the  largely  increased  unemployment  of 
nationals during the crisis years (Kahanec et al., 2016). This created a clear barrier 
for labor mobility from the one of the most important sending countries to Spain. The 
high unemployment and fractured economy made Spain much less attractive as a 
destination country.  The opposite  was true for  Germany,  as shown in Figure 4.4 
which reflects its economic stability. 
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The effects of the Eurozone crisis were extremely divergent across the EU which is 
reflected in Figure 4.4. Data available from the European Commission (2014) shows 
that migration flows were affected by unemployment differentials between countries. 
Even if mobility had been quite unidirectional mainly from east to the west before the 
Eurozone crisis, labor force from some of the member states of the Eurozone that 
were most severely affected by the crisis,  i.e.  PIIGS,  migrated to  the north.  This 
reflects the sharp increase of inflows to Germany. The capability of Germany to deal 
with  the  economic  shock to  ensure rapid  recovery,  has been described by  Syed 
Zwick  and Syed (2017)  to  be  highly  affected by  the  implementation  of  the  labor 
market  reforms over  a  decade before the Eurozone crisis.  In  Germany,  Intra-EU 
migrants’  wage  was  only  75  per  cent  than  that  of  natives’,  which  Elsner  and 
Zimmermann (2016) have brought up by emphasizing the ‘down skilling’ of migrants. 
However, the young and low-skilled migrants which were affected by the crisis the 
most, still earned relatively more in Germany than they would have in their sending 
country (Dustmann and Preston, 2019). Hence, the crisis made Germany much more 
attractive  to  migrants.
The outflows of Spanish natives during the Eurozone crisis  were surprisingly low 
compared to other Southern European countries, i.e. Portugal and Greece (Huart and 
Tchakpalla,  2019).  It  was rather the non-EU and intra-EU migrants who migrated 
from Spain during the economic shock towards the north. This can be explained by 
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two factors. Firstly, many migrants worked in the construction sector which suffered a 
large deterioration of positions during the economic shock (Fishman, 2012). Second, 
many of the Romanian migrants were employed on the construction sector and were 
among  the  most  significant  groups  of  migrants  residing  in  Spain.  When  Spain 
restricted the mobility of Romanians in 2011, it gave them another incentive to leave 
Spain in addition to the increased unemployment rate. Acknowledging the extremely 
high youth unemployment in Spain during the crisis, the fact that outflows did not 
affect the national population to any greater extent is quite surprising. To accelerate 
the recovery from the economic shock, Spain introduced a labor market reform in 
2012  promoting  internal  flexibility  which  included  redistribution  of  working  hours, 
changes  to  working  conditions,  and  wage  adjustments  (International  Labour 
Organization, 2015). This reform affected mostly the collective agreements but could 
still be seen as a starting point to a slow recovery which in Figure 4.3 is seen as a  
decrease of the peak of unemployment in 2013. Furthermore, from 2013 onwards 
(Figure 4.4), the increased inflows to Spain reflect the start of an economic recovery.
Spain and Germany serve as excellent examples of economies of the Eurozone that 
reacted in opposite ways to the crisis. The member states of the Eurozone which had 
not implemented any significant labor market reforms did so although this took place 
only after the national economy was severely hit. Along with the implementation of 
the labor market reforms in Spain in 2012, further training for the unemployed was 
offered to increase their capability of getting employed.  However, there is not much 
research done on whether this particular function of the vast labor market reform was 
behind the slowly decreasing unemployment rate (International Labour Organization, 
2015).  The  asymmetric  nature  of  the  crisis  can  be  observed  through  the 
unemployment rates of Spain and Germany (Figure 4.3). The fact that it  was the 
initial creditor countries’ taxpayers that carried most of the burden of bailing out some 
of the peripheral member states of the Eurozone raised political tensions around the 
EU and rendered it quite weak (Kundera, 2013; Schwartz, 2014; Frieden and Walter,  
2017).
According to Mundell (1961), in an OCA, residents of depressed regions can migrate 
to more prospering regions, which is how labor mobility in the EMU should work in 
theory. However, the Eurozone was quite far from being an OCA already before the 
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economic  shock which  eventually  created more  barriers for  labor  mobility.  In  the 
Spanish case, one reason for a low outflow of natives can be the high moving costs,  
which include existing mortgages and the significant lowering of housing prices as a 
reaction  to  the  shock (Kahanec et  al.,  2016).  Another  ‘barrier’  which  might  have 
depressed the mobility of the Spanish native labor force during the economic shock is 
the  %  !! Casares  and  Vasquez  (2018)  define  it  as  negative 
comovement between labor force and unemployment, i.e. the unemployed workers’ 
decrease  in  motivation  and  optimism  to  enter  the  labor  force  and  consequently 
deciding  to  stay  out  of  the  labor  force.  
In general, as it was the taxpayers in northern member states of the Eurozone that  
had to carry most of the burden of the bailouts, the political environment in the E(M)U 
turned somewhat more Eurosceptic than it was before the Eurozone crisis took place 
(De Grauwe, 2013; Eichengreen et al., 2014; Schwartz, 2014). In Germany and three 
other relatively prosperous, important receiving countries i.e. the UK and Austria, the 
increasing  mistrust  towards  the  benefits  of  labor  mobility  increased  during  the 
Eurozone  crisis  (Krause  et  al.,  2014).  All  of  these  countries  were  experiencing 
increasing inflows of intra-EU migrants and were concerned about welfare migration.  
The differences in business cycles of the north and the south of the Eurozone have 
thus created some political tensions around the EU. 
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Acknowledging  the  asymmetric  recovery  from  the  Eurozone  crisis,  the  wage 
differential-driven labor mobility was increasing. Likewise, Figure 4.4 shows the rapid 
growth of inflows to Germany since 2009. The European Commission (2020) states 
that the number of intra-EU inflows to Germany has been multiplied by three from 
2009 to 2015 when mobility inflows reached their peak. For Spain, on the other hand, 
the growth of inflows did not commence until 2013. Nonetheless, the growth of the 
number of intra-EU migrants has started to increase progressively since. Figure 4.4 
shows  a  drop  in  the  German  inflow  rate  after  2015.  However,  The  European 
Commission (2020) states that in 2018,  intra-EU inflows grew by five per cent in 
Germany although they still  have not  exceeded the inflows of  2016.  Overall,  the 
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graph shows a growing trust of the European labor force to the economies of the 
receiving countries which reflects an economic recovery.
The increased mobility to Spain reflects a lowered unemployment although it still is 
high in the country. As labor mobility in Europe is not at a level significant enough to 
show a remarkable macroeconomic impact as an economic stabilizer in the absence 
of  a  national  monetary  policy,  the  mobility  rates  show  that  also  most  of  the 
‘peripheral’  EU member  states,  including  Spain,  have almost  recovered from the 
asymmetric economic shock. According to Huart and Tchakpalla (2019), labor force 
reacted to national differences in unemployment during the crisis period reflecting 
thus the large outflow of migrants in Spain. On the other hand, Figure 4.5 shows how 
the unemployment that has decreased by about 10 percentage points may be one of 
the reasons behind Spain now being the third most popular receiving country of intra 
EU-migrants.  Yet,  the  decrease  of  Spain’s  unemployment  rate  shows  signs  of 
slowing down in 2019 even though it is quite high compared to many other countries 
of the Eurozone.
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Intra-EU labor mobility to Germany has slightly dropped since it reached its peak in 
2015, yet it  still  remains the most popular receiving country of intra-EU migrants. 
Furthermore, as Figure 4.6. shows its unemployment rate is constantly decreasing 
which can be seen as a pull-factor to migrate to Germany. On the other hand, the 
number of return mobility has increased over the recent years, which the European 
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Commission (2020) points out by showing that on average, for every four people who 
leave a country, three return. This can be seen as a consequence of the economic 
recovery  all  around  the  EU  despite  the  heterogeneity  of  the  different  national 
economies of the Eurozone. What made Germany such a popular destination country 
for EU-citizens is its high employment rate and a wage which is on average, higher 
than  in  other  popular  receiving  countries.  On  the  other  hand,  Elsner  and 
Zimmermann (2016) have emphasized that intra-EU migrants often work in positions 
lower than which would  correspond their  professional  skills.  The down skilling  of 
migrants  is  an  EU  wide  phenomenon  which  can  be  observed  in  Spain  as  well  
(Rodriguez-Planas and Farré, 2016). 
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The northern member states of  the Eurozone experienced the recovery relatively 
rapidly  after  the  initial  shock  of  which  Germany  is  a  perfect  example  of.  What 
distinguished especially Germany from the other member states of the Eurozone is 
the extent of labor market reforms implemented upon joining the monetary union in 
the 2000s. This is seen as one of the most important cornerstones behind Germany 
encountering  the  asymmetric  economic  shock  without  an  increase  in  the  rate  of 
unemployment as can be seen in Figure 4.6. Spain, on the other hand, represents 
the other end of  the spectrum. It  is  one of the PIIGS  which, unsurprisingly,  have 
recovered quite slowly from the Eurozone crisis compared to the more prosperous 
north.  Many, especially southern Eurozone member states as Spain, implemented 
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labor  market  reforms  only  after  the  economic  shock  had  deeply  affected  their 
economies  triggering  a  large  number  of  youth  unemployment.  This  can  still  be 
considered an issue for the whole Eurozone. Throughout the EU, the economic crisis 
has conjured mistrust in the functioning and longevity of the EMU (Syed Zwick and 
Syed, 2017; Popescu and Alpopi, 2017; Berger at al., 2019). 
In both countries of  interest,  labor mobility has been rather significant on the EU 
level,  which  yet  has  had  a  slight  macroeconomic  impact.  However,  in  order  to 
efficiently function as an economic stabilizer, the movement of labor ought to grow in 
dimension throughout the Eurozone. However, what the Eurozone crisis has shown 
both in Germany and in Spain is that the European labor force reacts to economic 
shocks and asymmetries by mobility, even though in Spain, the outflows influenced 
mostly the intra-EU migrants already residing in the area. This can partially be seen 
as a consequence of the restrictions Spain placed on the inflow of Romanians, yet, 
according to Rodriguez-Planas and Farré (2016) many of them have started since 
then to return to Spain.
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During  the  interviews  with  four  EU  experts  representing  three  different  member 
states, Finland, Germany, and France, they represented multiple different views on 
how the movement of labor in the EU should function. Interviewee #1, working as a 
Member of the European Parliament, presented the most determined ideas on the 
future of the EU. Interviewee #2 who works as a Senior Specialist on Employment 
Matters, gave a very realistic view on the current trends of labor mobility, and what 
may influence it in the future still showing similarities with the answers of Interviewee 
#1. More of an economic perspective was presented by Interviewee #3 working as an 
Economic Analyst. Lastly, the opinions of Interviewee #4, a Policy Analyst, were very 
realistic and compatible with what was found in the previous literature research. 
All four interviewees brought up similar themes which are divided in three. First, the 
viewpoints of  interviewees are represented on the benefits  of  an increased labor 
mobility. The first subsection thus assesses views on the ability of labor mobility to 
facilitate economic growth, reduce the unemployment effects around the Eurozone, 
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and  the  behavior  of  labor  mobility  during  the  Eurozone  crisis.  Second,  the 
interviewees’  answers  on the  different  pull-factors  of  labor  mobility  are  examined 
introducing themes such as agglomeration effects, barriers to labor mobility, and the 
wage gaps present in the Eurozone that incentivize mobility.  Overall,  the general 
risks  and  opportunities  of  labor  mobility  to  the  EMU  are  outlined.  Lastly,  the 
interviewees’ viewpoints are presented on the stabilizing effects labor mobility offers 
to the economies of the EU by highlighting the benefits it may bring for the Eurozone 
in the future.
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All interviewees emphasized that skilled workers are needed all around the E(M)U 
and  labor  mobility  does  facilitate  an  easier  way  of  matching  skills  to  different 
positions. Their answers are quite concurrent with observations literature makes on 
the benefits of labor mobility (D’Amuri and Peri, 2014; Zaiceva, 2014; Dustmann and 
Preston,  2019).  Interviewee #4  points  out,  that  this  is  the  case  especially  when 
observing  the  niche  skillsets.  Three  out  of  the  four  interviewees  point  out  the 
importance of simpler allocation of human capital. On the other hand, interviewee #2 
states that in the future, extensive allocation of human capital may not be needed. 
“The  future  labour  markets  are  most  likely  more  flexible  and  global  due  to 
digitalisation.” However, only one of the four interviewees mentioned digitalization as 
a factor enhancing the flexibility of labor markets. Although telecommunication might 
simplify the allocation of human capital in the future, also interviewee #2 agrees that 
the major benefits can be seen in easing the mismatch of skills in some areas. The 
reviewed literature (D’Amuri and Peri, 2014; Zaiceva, 2014; Dustmann and Preston, 
2019), however, does not discuss the effect of digitalization, perhaps due to the fact 
that digitalization has become significantly more rapid during the past few years. 
Reducing  unemployment  while  also  filling  gaps  in  economies  of  some  areas  is 
another benefit mentioned by all interviewees. Interviewees #1 and #2 take a more 
proactive  stance  by  stating  that  the  EU  should  implement  some  process  of 
harmonization  of  unemployment  rights.  This  would  hence eventually  intensify  the 
mobility of labor, as the incentive to move would increase. In addition, Interviewee #4 
points out that labor mobility during the Eurozone crisis proved to have a positive 
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impact on the short-term stabilization of unemployment benefits. Frieden and Walter 
(2017)  agree that  many countries  that  implemented reforms addressing  the  high 
unemployment situation did see their economies benefitting in the short term. The 
movement of labor in the EU has indeed helped to control unemployment in some 
areas. Although interviewees acknowledge that the extent of labor mobility has been 
marginal, all of them recognize its impact in reducing unemployment.
It is widely agreed that labor mobility facilitates economic growth, both by literature 
and interviewees. An important question to pose when examining how much labor 
mobility affects economic growth is brought up by Interviewee #4. “- - who is leaving, 
is it those who would actually contribute quite significantly to economic growth and 
wage growth in the home country (highly skilled). Or whether it is let’s say just a more 
broadly said median worker who is moving abroad and therefore reduces the labor 
pull which puts pressure on the wages and therefore should be a factor price equality 
tendency.” Thus, the skillsets of the migrants should be observed to a further extent 
in order to define the precise growth labor mobility assures the Eurozone’s economy. 
This is an important notion as the European Commission (2020) states that in 2018, 
23 per cent of intra-EU movers had low education, 40 per cent had medium, and 36  
per cent had high. Other interviewees emphasized how labor mobility can manage 
the demand of labor in areas experiencing high economic growth. Interviewee #3 
represents similar ideas pointing out to the theory of Optimum Currency Areas by 
discussing the possibility for increased competitiveness in sending countries as well 
“The level  of  labor supply will  have an effect on wages and therefore prices and 
therefore  competitiveness.”  Interviewee  #3  highlights  furthermore  that  if  flexible 
enough, labor mobility would provide a win-win situation for both the sending and 
receiving country,  which is  similar  to  the findings of  Ritzen and Kahanec (2017). 
Furthermore, he sees that it may create a more multidirectional mobility for workers in 
the EU.
An interesting factor was brought up by Interviewee #4 who pointed out that even 
when thinking about the benefits of labor mobility,  one needs to consider that all 
countries  do not  react  similarly  to  an  economic  shock which  was visible  already 
during  the Eurozone crisis.  “One example here  is  Greece or  the  Baltic  countries 
which actually  had quite  a high response in  terms of  mobility  following the crisis 
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whereas  Italy  or  Spain  did  not  or  rather  there  was  a  significant  lag,  and  the 
composition of labor mobility was also small.” Literature has pointed this out to quite 
a  significant  extent  utilizing  examples  of  how  differently  the  outflows  reacted  in 
countries that were the most severely affected by the crisis (Goshray et al., 2016;  
Frieden and Walter, 2017). When looking at how to handle labor mobility in the EU, 
literature underlines that there is no such thing as a one-size-fits-all  policy which 
would function for all  labor force in the EMU which is also described by Fishman 
(2012). 
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Differentials in net-wages between the member states are significant pull-factors of 
labor mobility as all interviewees mention. The European Commission (2020) further 
highlights  these  wage  gaps.  For  example,  the  average  monthly  salary  of  a 
professional  working  in  Poland  is  2158  euros  compared  to  Germany  where  the 
average  wage  of  professionals  is  4547  euros.  Unsurprisingly,  Interviewee  #3 
mentions that unidirectional labor mobility, mainly from east to the west is caused 
mostly by the agglomeration effect which, in some cases, may be considered as a 
push factor. Three out of the four interviewees mention the agglomeration effects,  
especially  in  the  areas where  the  EU utilizes  its  cohesion policy.  Interviewee #1 
mentions that these people gravitate towards better education and employment in 
general,  although this might create brain or workforce drain in the most  common 
sending countries of migrants. Hasselbalch (2019) takes an even stronger stance by 
stating  that  brain  drain  is  a  policy  issue for  the  EU which  should  be  paid  more 
attention to, instead of labor mobility. Yet, all interviewees agree that although brain 
drain is an issue, the benefits of labor mobility outweigh the costs in the long run.
Unemployment  is  a  push-factor  mentioned  by  three  interviewees.  Thus,  it  is  not 
surprising that labor force gravitates towards a more secure chance of employment. 
Yet, Interviewee #4 represents an opposite view by claiming that asymmetric shocks 
in  unemployment  do  not  work  as  a  push  or  a  pull-factor,  and  points  to  the  low 
outflows of Spanish nationals in Spain during the Eurozone crisis.  According to the 
literature  reviewed  however,  what  incentivizes  the  labor  force  to  migrate  is  the 
opportunity  for  a  better  wage and the unemployment rate in  the sending country 
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(Zaiceva, 2014; Kahanec et al., 2016; Huart and Tchakpalla, 2019). Still, one could 
say  that  for  nationals  of  countries  with  already  a  very  low  unemployment  rate, 
unemployment may not be considered either a push or a pull-effect. When assessing 
the  low  unemployment  rate  of  a  potential  receiving  country  as  a  pull-factor, 
Interviewee #1 addresses the high numbers of unemployment of especially young 
people in  the southern member states  of  the EU.  The high unemployment  in  for 
example Greece, has indeed initiated large outflows of natives, which Interviewee #4 
describes. It would be extremely important, according to Interviewee #1, that these 
large unemployment differentials should further be addressed at the EU  level. The 
question on how that change is implemented is answered by her discussing mostly 
increasing integration, which has shown to be quite difficult in reality. 
Important factors that may prevent the mobility of labor which two out of the four 
interviewees mention are the different cultures and languages in the EU. These are 
considered to be the barriers that are the hardest to address. Interviewee #3 states 
that  there  is  almost  no  way  to  address  the  issue,  but  Interviewees  #1  and  #4 
introduce  ideas  on  how  the  language  barriers  could  be  lowered.  Interviewee  #1 
represents a view on the  harmonization  of  the education  levels  and as  they are 
divergent across the EU. On the other hand, Interviewee #2 shows that the member 
states have extremely different views and are not willing to go for more harmonization 
despite extensive negotiations. Interviewee #4 mentions the Erasmus program as 
one  of  the  important  existing  EU  initiatives  that,  in  addition  to  improving  one’s 
language skills, can increase their willingness to one day work abroad. They highlight 
the fact that the level of English skills of Europeans is constantly increasing, and this 
might  later  on  be  seen  as  something  that  may  have  an impact  on  lowering  the 
language and cultural barriers.
Apart from highlighting cultural barriers, two interviewees mention the administrative 
barriers, the most important one being the recognition of professional qualifications in 
other  member  states.  Interviewee #2 adds,  that  in  addition  to  one’s  professional 
qualifications, the social benefits are extremely difficult to transport from one member 
state to another.  Furthermore,  Kahanec et al.  (2016) state that  language barriers 
automatically make it  more difficult to transfer one’s knowledge and qualifications. 
Thus,  there  are  multiple  cultural  barriers  affecting  all  the  administrative  ones. 
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Interviewee #1 has multiple ideas on further lowering barriers which include some 
extent of harmonizing the EU-wide policy on for example social security to increase 
labor mobility in the EU. Knowing that interviewee #1 works in a decision-making 
role, it is not surprising that the reforms she suggests are more ambitious than the 
other interviewees’.  Nevertheless, these reforms would only be feasible if a solution 
to the negotiations among member states would be found. Interviewee #2 concludes 
in  the  following way:  “Labour  mobility  is  a  highly  political  matter  and will  not  be 
treated in the EU purely on the basis of economic theory even if it brings benefits to  
member states during economic shocks”. Literature points out that after the Eurozone 
crisis, possible economic integration would promote labor mobility but instead, the 
process on deepening the integration has slowed down (Bertola, 2016; Syed Zwick 
and Syed, 2017). Hence, the barriers are expected, by the interviewees as well, to 
lower over time, although this can largely depend on the depth of integration.
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The role of labor mobility as an economic stabilizer in case of an asymmetric shock 
was something that all  interviewees agreed was very important. Two interviewees 
made interesting comparisons between the stabilizing effects of labor mobility in the 
EU and the United States (US). As is known, even though both offer their citizens the 
freedom of movement of labor, the EU has multiple barriers the US does not. “- - the 
rates (of labor mobility in the EU compared to the US) are much lower and there are 
several barriers, some that are quite deeply engrained and harder to address.” As the 
extent of labor mobility in the US is much larger than in the EU, its position as an 
economic stabilizer is very clear. Even though interviewee #4 states that the EU’s 
mobility flows are far behind the US, the recent Eurozone crisis did incentivize labor 
to move to a larger extent. Basso et al. (2019) agree, that the limited mobility of EU-
citizens might well be caused due to the different barriers that do not exist in the US 
such as cultural barriers which can hardly be addressed.
While working as a stabilizer to a modest extent compared to the US, one of the 
interviewees pointed out that labor mobility has the capacity to absorb 25 per cent of 
an economic shock. The decision-makers of the EU tend to observe the same impact 
and are aiming to drive further integration to enforce stabilization of the economy. 
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Literature has suggested a similar effect as the interviewees, for example Arpaia et 
al. (2016) agree that labor mobility in the EU has the ability to absorb a quarter of the 
shock,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  shock  is  absorbed  through  labor  mobility 
increases over time. There are thus feasible solutions existing for the Eurozone to 
balance its economy in case of an asymmetric economic shock despite the lack of a 
harmonized fiscal policy. Interviewee #4 is the only one who does not mention the 
lack of further fiscal integration as a possible problem creating a barrier for  labor 
mobility. It is true, that in theory, fiscal integration would be a feasible way to promote 
an even faster recovery from an economic shock which literature addresses as well. 
On the other hand, there exists a large divergence between the opinions of various 
member states which is one of the reasons why further fiscal integration has not 
taken place.
Labor mobility is quite marginal in the EU at the moment which all the interviewees 
and literature acknowledge to a significant extent, yet its abilities to function as a 
stabilizer should not be underestimated. One of the interviewees has multiple ideas 
on possible further integration and recognizes,  that the extent  of labor mobility is  
extremely likely to increase in the future, thus creating a stronger shock absorbing 
effect. Likewise, interviewee #3 addresses the OCA theory in a positive light, showing 
that the Eurozone has the ability to become an OCA if reforms are made. All the  
interviewees pointed out to the need of reforms to build a more integrated economy 
for the Eurozone. On the other hand, digitalization, as Interviewee #2 mentioned, 
might  easily  lower some of  the barriers  for  labor  mobility,  and thus increase the 
stabilizing effect in the future even if the extent of integration would be slight.
The  future  of  labor  mobility  as  an  absorber  of  economic  shocks  in  the  EU  is 
discussed  by  all  the  interviewees.  They  all  agree  that  European  labor  force  is 
extremely likely  to  respond to  asymmetric economic shocks to  a more significant 
degree in the future. Interviewee #4 feels that thanks to the Erasmus program and 
the increasing language skills of young people, they might be more incentivized to 
move and work abroad. “They (young people) are already in the mindset of seeking 
opportunities abroad which of course makes it much more likely that they if there’s an 
economic shock, that they actually do move to another member state.” A question 
this interviewee poses is how labor mobility is affected by Brexit of 2020. The UK is  
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an extremely popular country of destination of Intra-EU migrants and the UK leaving 
the European Union is likely to result in an increased labor mobility. This might create 
an effect opposite to the agglomeration effect, which is return mobility, that benefits 
economies  by  increasing  the  amount  of  human capital  in  also  the  remote  areas 
(Dustmann and Preston, 2019). One of the interviewees concludes the interview by 
stating that return mobility may create jobs in the home countries of migrants and 
thus, increase the demand of labor putting upward pressure on wages. Overall, the 
interviewees see the movement of labor in a very optimistic light in terms of its future 
capability as an absorber of asymmetric economic shocks.
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As literature and recent events have shown, labor mobility in the EU is not working to 
its full extent and thus has brought only a marginal impact on the economy of the 
Eurozone as a stabilizer of asymmetric shocks. The purpose of this research was to 
find  a  feasible  answer  to  why  it  has  not  been  working  to  its  full  capacity  while  
emphasizing  the  benefits  it  can  bring  to  the  Eurozone  and  the  EU as  a  whole.  
Defining the barriers of ‘free’  movement of  labor in the EU and highlighting what 
could be done to lower those were essential aims this of work. This section brings 
together  the  research  made  in  this  work  and  is  structured  as  follows:  first,  the 
suggested  and  implemented  EU-wide  polices  are  discussed  by  highlighting  the 
differentiating  perspectives  on  the  feasibility  and  effectiveness  of  these  reforms. 
Then,  the  ‘win-win’  situation  that  labor  mobility  in  the  E(M)U  can  offer  for  the 
economies of both the sending and receiving countries is critically assessed. Lastly, 
the overall impact of labor mobility for the economies of the Eurozone is discussed 
through analysis of its future direction.
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Already  through  reviewing  literature,  it  became clear  that  there  exists  no  mutual 
understanding or agreement on how to promote the mobility of labor and increase 
integration  in  the  Eurozone.  The  opinions  on  the  reforms  which  should  be 
implemented vary to a large extent depending on where the person that is being 
46
interviewed is from, an effect which is observed by Krause et al. (2017) even among 
labor economists. In the qualitative interviews, the Finnish interviewee working in a 
decision-making  role  has  quite  ambitious  ideas  and  suggests  for  example  some 
extent of fiscal harmonization, which is rarely mentioned by EU experts coming from 
the more prosperous areas of the EU. Other three interviewees working in expert 
roles did not mention fiscal integration as something that would be feasible although 
they, to some extent, felt that it would be needed. However, the current Stability and 
Growth Pact of the EU is one of the only methods of controlling the fiscal policy of the 
member states, which was initially thought to be a sufficient measure to prepare the 
Eurozone  for  an  asymmetric  shock  (Jones  et  al.,  2016;  Azcona,  2019).  As  the 
interviewees  pointed  out,  although  extensive  negotiations  have  taken  place,  the 
member states have not been able to agree upon implementing any policy reforms. 
This is quite unsurprising knowing that the different member states of the Eurozone 
are extremely divergent when it  comes to their economies and furthermore, fiscal 
policies.  Furthermore,  Berger  et  al.  (2019)  have  found  that  low  public  debt  and 
deficits do not make the Eurozone invulnerable. Labor mobility is thus largely thought 
to be a cornerstone of the EMU, as it  is one of the most important measures of 
economic stabilization.
During  the  Eurozone  crisis,  many  member  states  of  the  Eurozone  decided  to 
implement labor  market  reforms to  reduce unemployment and help stabilize their 
economies. As seen through the comparison between Germany and Spain, one of 
the  reasons  for  Germany’s  rapid  recovery  were  the  labor  market  reforms  it 
implemented nationally  after  joining  the  monetary  union  in  the  early  2000s.  One 
example of these are the Hartz-reforms, which have played a tremendous role in 
keeping the unemployment rate low in Germany throughout the crisis (Goshray et al,  
2016; Syed Zwick and Syed, 2017). The reforms Spain implemented during the crisis 
did  not  have  such  a  tremendous  impact  but  initiated  a  slow  recovery  from  the 
Eurozone crisis. Literature reviewed, case study, and the interviewees’ answers are 
concurrent with the notion that significant heterogeneity exists among the Eurozone 
member states’ economies. The current state of knowledge on the subject implies 
that reforms would be needed. The differentiating opinions of the different member 
states are on the way of increasing the economic convergence of the EMU. It is clear 
that  sufficient  labor  mobility  benefits  national  economies  to  a  large  extent,  even 
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though one of the interviewees pointed out that it is still being discussed as more of a 
political  than  economic  matter  when making  decisions.  In  addition  to  one  of  the 
interviewees, especially Fishman (2012) emphasizes that labor mobility in the EU 
cannot function by implementing a one-size-fits-all policy. 
The divergences in unemployment rates around the EU were, and still  are great.  
Examples discussed on how labor force in Spain and Germany reacted during the 
Eurozone crisis portrays two opposite cases. The interviews proved that in addition to 
the  northern  and  southern  member  states  of  the  Eurozone,  the  extent  of  labor 
mobility in the southern member states during the Eurozone crisis did not follow a 
similar pattern. The example of Greece and Spain was explained by an interviewee, 
pointing out that in Spain, the outflows of labor force during the crisis were mostly 
consisted of the intra-EU migrants, whereas the outflows of labor force from Greece 
consisted  mostly  of  Greek  natives.  The  interviewees  consider  the  recognition  of 
qualifications in different member states to be a significant barrier of labor mobility the 
EU should work upon. In addition to recognition of qualifications, the citizens of the 
EU might have problems with the ‘transportation’ of employment and social rights 
which literature takes into account as well. One of the interviewees highlighted the 
possibility of a similar ‘EU-wide unemployment’ insurance that has been suggested 
by Berger et al. (2019). Furthermore, in order to increase labor mobility’s extent in the 
way  that  it  would  have  a  significant  macroeconomic  impact,  a  lot  needs  to  be 
achieved. A significant lowering of the barriers and increasing the EMU’s economic 
convergence are mentioned, by the interviewees, as objectives to reach in the future. 
However, achieving these objectives is much easier said than done.
Overall, labor mobility can be seen as one of the most important factors in increasing 
the  economic  well-being  of  the  Eurozone.  It  is  clear  that  the  EU should  take  a 
stronger stance on supporting the people unemployed by encouraging them to move 
(Huart and Tchakpalla, 2019). Furthermore, as one of the interviewees concluded, 
there are going to be factors influencing lowering the barriers on labor mobility, for 
example digitalization and the improving language skills of persons. Even though the 
integration  process  has  slowed  down  due  to  differentiating  opinions  of  member 
states, as Dustmann and Preston (2019) state, a fiscal union may not be needed but 
a further state of integration should be achieved. Labor mobility is working as a tool  
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for internal devaluation in the lack of a national monetary policy but it’s extent is quite 
insignificant (Kahanec et al,  2016).  Yet,  the Eurozone crisis showed the EU, that 
labor force does react to an asymmetric economic shock by increasing the mobility of 
labor.
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Literature widely agrees that migrants are the winners of labor mobility, and that labor  
mobility is something that benefits both the receiving and sending countries (Zaiceva, 
2014; Basso et al.,  2019; Dustmann and Preston, 2019).  All  interviewees agreed 
upon this fact, although one mentioned that brain drain might turn into a problem for 
some  of  the  sending  countries.  Brain  drain  has  indeed  been  ignored  during  the 
Eurozone crisis by the decision-makers who focused more on the economic recovery 
(Hasselbalch, 2019). However, even the interviewee who mentioned brain drain as a 
possible  issue,  declared that  the  benefits  of  labor  mobility  outweigh its  costs.  In  
addition,  two interviewees mention that  the extent  of  return mobility  is  increasing 
constantly  due  to  the  partial  recovery  from  the  economic  shock.  The  European 
Commission  (2020)  found,  that  for  example,  on  average,  most  of  the  intra-EU 
migrants in Germany reside there for less than ten years which could reflect a high 
rate of return mobility. Return mobility impacts the economy of the home country, as 
the acquired skills  create jobs and thereby increase the demand for  labor  which 
should also put upward pressure on wages, as stated by one of the interviewees. 
As labor mobility has been on an upward trend during the recent years, labor force 
around the Eurozone has proven to react to economic shocks. The reactions of labor 
force to asymmetries in the economy drives them towards better opportunities which 
may cause agglomeration effects. Literature that was examined does not mention the 
agglomeration  effects  to  a  large  extent,  although  brain  drain  is,  in  some  cases, 
impacted by the effect.  Three out of the four interviewees mention agglomeration 
effects as possible drawbacks of labor mobility. On the other hand, Elsner (2013) 
proves out that a win-win situation is acquired for both the sending and receiving 
countries. He emphasizes that the unemployment rates have decreased in most of 
the member states of the EU that have joined after the three eastern enlargements, 
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and labor mobility has played a significant role in contributing it. Literature is quite 
concurrent  with  the  answers  given  by  the  interviewees  who  all  have  expertise 
regarding EU-wide mobility. Although the interviewees mentioned some drawbacks of 
labor mobility, they pointed out that it does bring benefits to both the receiving and 
the sending countries which outweighs the costs. The benefits of labor mobility for 
the destination countries might be more evident as D’Amuri and Peri (2014) prove by 
showing that the doubling of the migrant population increases the specialization of 
natives by five per cent.
Very little fiscal harmonization exists in the Eurozone, and methods for stabilizing the 
effects of asymmetric shocks and the heterogeneity that are present in the area are 
only  few.  This  is  why  labor  mobility  ought  to  play  a  more  substantial  role  when 
thinking  about  the  implementation  of  possible  policy  reforms.  However,  all  the 
research made for this thesis has proven that considering the modest extent of labor 
mobility, it has shown to be effective in improving the economic situation of member 
states which can be seen in the case of Germany, which can, today, be considered 
as the ‘heart of labor mobility’ in the E(M)U (European Commission, 2020). However, 
as all  member states of the EU cannot  experience similar inflows of migrants as 
Germany, ways to make labor mobility more multi-directional needs to be discovered, 
as one of the interviewees working in an expert role mentioned. This would benefit all  
member states. According to Mundell (1961), unemployment could be avoided if the 
central  bank  would  agree  that  the  burden  of  adjusting  to  asymmetric  economic 
shocks would largely fall  on the surplus countries. This was seen throughout the 
Eurozone crisis, as burden of the asymmetric economic shock was mostly carried by 
the surplus countries raising political tensions that one of the interviewees mentioned. 
These  tensions  can  be  seen  as  something  that  prevent  the  further  integration 
process.
All  in all,  the research conducted for this thesis shows that  labor mobility  indeed 
brings  benefits  to  the  sending  and  receiving  countries.  In  the  lack  of  a  national 
monetary policy, labor mobility has shown to work, although to a slight extent, as 
means of internal devaluation. A fiscal integration proposed by many scholars, has 
been thought to be necessary, because the Single European Labor Market is not 
working to a sufficient extent (Jones et al., 2016; Krause et al., 2017; Berger et al.,  
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2019). The political tensions between some of the Eurozone’s member states that 
have grown during the recent years have significantly slowed the integration process 
down  regarding  fiscal  harmonization  to  promote  a  faster  recovery  from  future 
asymmetric shocks. This research sees, that although labor mobility is focused on as 
more of a political than economic issue, it should be promoted since it is one of the 
only  ways  to  stabilize  the  effects  of  asymmetric  economic  shocks,  which  the 
Eurozone has recently experienced. The current positive macroeconomic situation of 
the Eurozone can be seen through the increasing return mobility. And vice versa, an 
asymmetric  shock  does  promote  labor  mobility  to  more  prosperous  regions,  as 
shown during the Eurozone crisis, seeing the examples from the PIIGS.
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In general, the research conducted in this thesis sees labor mobility as something 
that  impacts  the  effectiveness  of  the  EMU  by  functioning  as  a  stabilizer  of  the 
Eurozone’s economy by absorbing asymmetric economic shocks. The percentage of 
intra-EU movers out of the whole population of the EU is however rather small, 4,2 
per cent, the number of movers being 17.6 million in 2018 (European Commission, 
2020).  The movement of labor has been on an upward trend recently which has 
increased the impact of it as an economic stabilizer. Yet, in order for the Eurozone to 
get closer to being an optimum currency area, the extent of labor mobility should be 
much greater. When conducting the interviews, it was clear that all the interviewees 
were  somewhat  concerned  about  how  the  Eurozone  is  able  to  handle  another 
possible  asymmetric  economic  shock  if  integration  is  not  furthered.  If  economic 
integration is added, its endogenic consequences would include labor policy reforms 
(Bertola,  2016)  which  would  promote  the  mobility  of  labor  thus  having  a  more 
significant macroeconomic impact on the Eurozone’s economy.
Examining the recent Eurozone crisis, it is clear that the EMU was not prepared for it,  
possibly  due  to  the  decision-makers’  reluctancy  to  delegate  authority  and  make 
reforms which Jones et al. (2016) describe very well by calling their action before and 
during the Eurozone crisis ‘failing forward’. From the interviews, however, it became 
clear that perhaps the idea of failing forward might stem from the lack of effective 
furthering of the integration process due to the differentiating opinions of the member 
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states.  The  case  of  Germany  and  Spain  showed  how  labor  force  in  these  two 
member  states  of  the  Eurozone  reacted  in  somewhat  opposite  ways.  The  large 
outflows  from  Spain,  during  the  Eurozone  crisis,  consisted  mostly  of  intra-EU 
migrants and not natives even though the unemployment rate was extremely high, 
whereas Germany became the hotspot of labor mobility. Most likely, the Eurozone 
faces a similar situation in the near future, where the heterogeneity of the monetary 
union as a whole is close to tearing it down. This is why the decision-makers in the 
EU should start  emphasizing the movement  of  labor  to  a more significant  extent 
because  labor  mobility  has  the  ability  to  absorb  25  per  cent  of  an  asymmetric 
economic shock in a year (European Commission, 2014; Arpaia et al., 2016; Krause 
et al, 2017).
Labor  mobility  should  be  considered  an  essential  factor  to  the  contribution  to 
longevity of the EMU. As the interviewees mentioned, factors such as digitalization 
and the increasing level of language skills are aspects that play a significant role in 
the development of the movement of labor in the EU. The recent development shows 
that labor would be more mobile in case of an asymmetric shock, but on the other 
hand, the decision makers of the EU should not assume that labor mobility in all  
member states would react in the same way. It is clear that a one-size-fits-all policy  
does  not  function  in  the  Eurozone,  as  differences  even  among the  PIIGS’  labor 
mobility were evident during the previous asymmetric economic shock. And as the 
Spanish  case  proved,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  the  asymmetries  and 
underlying  problems  in  national  economies  are  often  present  before  the  shocks 
(Fishman, 2012), and economic shocks might reveal and worsen them by creating 
significant issues.
Thus,  the  question  should  not  be  whether  the extent  of  labor  mobility  increases, 
rather if it is capable to increase to a volume significant enough. Many interviewees, 
and literature to some extent, compared the labor mobility in the EU and in the US. 
Even though the magnitude of labor mobility in the US is much greater than in the 
Eurozone, several more barriers to mobility exist in the EU. As found through the 
case study, interviews, and literature, labor mobility is handled as a political matter  
and furthermore, objections against it are much more often political than economic 
(Dustmann and Preston,  2019).  Throughout  the  primary  and  secondary  research 
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conducted for this thesis, it has become clear that the economic benefits of labor 
mobility outweigh its costs. Therefore, an increasing volume of labor mobility in the 
future would show a positive effect for the economy of the Eurozone, ensuring an 
efficient recovery from possible future asymmetric economic shocks. Even though no 
significant reforms would be made, Huart and Tchakpalla (2019) agree that the labor  
force all around the EU would react by labor mobility. The cases of Germany and 
Spain show, that a similar reaction of the movement of labor cannot be seen in all 
member states of the Eurozone due to the divergences in their national economies.
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This research has focused mostly on the mobility of EU-citizens in the Eurozone, and 
its impacts on national economies of its member states. This section will highlight and 
summarize  the  main  conclusions  from  conducting  both  primary  and  secondary 
research to answer the initial research questions. Second, the possibilities of intra-EU 
labor  mobility  are  addressed  in  the  context  of  International  Business  and  last, 
suggestions for further research are presented.
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Having shown the upward trend of labor mobility in the EU during the recent years, it  
can be safely stated that its increase does have a positive, although slight, impact on 
the  Eurozone’s  longevity.  Most  importantly,  labor  mobility  affects  economies 
positively by stabilizing and absorbing asymmetric shocks. Although this research 
has shown its positive macroeconomic outcomes, labor mobility is often treated as 
more of a political than economic issue on the EU level. Member states have shown 
to  be  quite  undecisive  when  it  comes  to  reforms or  integration  encouraging  the 
movement of labor in the Eurozone which became clear through conducting both 
primary and secondary research for this thesis. 
Multiple barriers for labor mobility in the Eurozone exist, but as research in this thesis 
has shown, these barriers are very likely to decrease in the future due to for example, 
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digitalization and improving language skills. Thus, European labor mobility is likely to 
continue increasing, and impact in addition to the EMU and national economies, the 
demographic situation caused by the aging of population. However,  the extent of 
labor  mobility  is  still  modest,  but  its  constant  growth  affects  its  ability  to  absorb 
shocks to a further extent in the future. Furthermore, labor mobility in the Eurozone 
does provide, in an economic sense, a win-win situation for both the sending and 
receiving  countries.
Due to the asymmetry of the different economies of the Eurozone, the economic 
recovery from the Eurozone crisis has taken place at very different times around the 
different member states. This research focused on the cases of Spain and Germany 
by utilizing secondary data. This case study showed that differences between the 
central and southern member states of the Eurozone are vast when it comes to the 
ability to recover from an asymmetric economic shock. However, differences in labor 
mobility during the recovery from economic shocks differ in all member states and 
thus,  the divergences between the Eurozone’s  member  states  cannot  be divided 
solely  between  for  example  the  north  and the  south  that  both  literature  and  the 
conducted interviews showed. This thesis has presented, that the implementation of 
labor  market  and  economic  reforms before  an  economic  shock has  a  significant 
impact on a faster recovery from an economic shock which the case of Germany 
shows.  This  is  why  all  member  states  should  consider  emphasizing  the 
implementation  of  reforms  before  their  economies  are  deeply  affected  by  an 
asymmetric shock.
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Shown in this thesis, labor mobility is a prerequisite for the Eurozone’s longevity. The 
supply of labor has a significant impact on the wages, price levels, and therefore,  
competitiveness. Thus, the growth of labor mobility in the Eurozone can be expected 
to increase its competitiveness in the global market as well. The freedom of labor  
mobility is an extremely important part of the European Union, and at the heart of the 
single market. By absorbing asymmetric shocks, and thus stabilizing the economy of 
the Eurozone, labor mobility contributes to the effective functioning of the European 
single market.
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Labor  mobility  in  the  Eurozone  has  not  been  substantially  researched,  and  thus 
would require further, both qualitative and quantitative, research. There are still many 
aspects of labor mobility  in the E(M)U to be researched. An interesting focus for 
future research could be the effect the Brexit of 2020 and referendum of 2016 have 
had on labor mobility in the UK. Furthermore, as the extent of return mobility has 
been increasing, an interesting area to research is its exact effect on the national  
economy of the home country of the migrant. Similar research to this thesis could be 
conducted with a larger sample size in order to determine the exact labor mobility in 
the different member states and the impact to the Eurozone’s national economies. In 
the future, an interesting topic to research from the point of view of labor mobility is 
digitalization, especially the extent to which it can lower the barriers of moving. 
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